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Targeted Social Transparency as Global 
Corporate Strategy 
 
By Stephen Kim Park* 
 
Abstract: Recent years have seen the emergence of mandatory disclosure regimes 
under U.S. federal securities law with the express purpose of advancing 
geographically defined, issue-specific social policy objectives, which I collectively 
refer to as “targeted social transparency” (TST) regimes.  This Article addresses the 
appeal and shortcomings of mandatory disclosure as a means of regulating global 
corporate conduct—focusing on the unique challenges posed by TST.  Two 
contemporary examples of TST are analyzed: (i) the “conflict minerals” provisions in 
the Dodd-Frank Act, which require the disclosure of minerals whose mining is 
associated with human rights violations in the Democratic Republic of Congo; and (ii) 
disclosure requirements under the Iran Threat Reduction and Syria Human Rights Act 
with respect to commercial activities associated with the Iranian government’s 
suppression of human rights.  This Article presents the concept of constructive 
discourse, which seeks to enhance the effectiveness of mandatory disclosure by 
addressing these related objectives: (i) how TST can catalyze internally driven 
changes in corporate behavior to the mutual benefit of MNEs and stakeholders; and 
(ii) how MNEs can use TST for strategic purposes.  Using the concept of constructive 
discourse, this Article identifies and explores specific ways that TST regimes can 
shape socially beneficial, strategically rational corporate conduct. 
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
 
Governance of the international economy increasingly hinges on 
awareness and knowledge concerning the activities of multinational 
enterprises (MNEs).1  One mechanism to achieve this objective is 
mandatory disclosure of information by MNEs and other business entities 
to the public.  Public concern about the noneconomic effects of global 
business has led to the growing use of mandatory disclosure to advance 
social goals—such as international human rights and environmental 
sustainability—under the rubric of social transparency.  The concept of 
social transparency mandates the reporting of various adverse social and 
environmental impacts by the firm responsible for causing them.2  Social 
transparency expands the scope of a company’s obligations to a broader set 
of parties, often referred to as stakeholders, which can affect or are affected 
by its decisions.3 
Within this broad context, this Article focuses on a new phenomenon 
with far reaching implications—mandatory disclosure regimes based on 
what I refer to as “targeted social transparency” (or TST).  TST consists of 
government administered reporting systems that require the public 
disclosure of social impacts to fulfill geographically defined or issue 
specific noneconomic public policy objectives, or both.4  Compared to other 
forms of social transparency, TST regimes target social impacts specific to  
individual countries, regions, or industries.  TST has become a particularly 
 
 1 This Article uses “MNE” in reference to any firm or company with cross-border operations.  As 
specifically noted herein, certain observations specifically apply to publicly held, multinational 
corporations, the most prevalent and prominent form of an MNE. 
 2 This Article defines social transparency as public reporting of “information about the products a 
reporting company produces, the countries in which it does business, [and] the labor and environmental 
effects of the company's operations here and abroad.”  See Cynthia A. Williams, The Securities and 
Exchange Commission and Corporate Social Transparency, 112 HARV. L. REV. 1197, 1201 n.5 (1999) 
(defining social disclosure qua corporate social transparency).  In this Article, social and environmental 
impacts caused by MNEs are collectively referred to as social impacts unless otherwise indicated or 
qualified. 
 3 See Andrew Keay, Stakeholder Theory in Corporate Law: Has It Got What It Takes?, 9 RICH. J. 
GLOBAL L. & BUS. 249, 256 (2010) (defining stakeholders); see also Thomas Donaldson & Lee E. 
Preston, The Stakeholder Theory of the Corporation: Concepts, Evidence, and Implications, 20 ACAD. 
MGMT. REV. 65, 68–69 (1995) (identifying investors, governments, suppliers, trade associations, 
employees, communities, customers, and political groups). 
 4 This term draws in part on research by Archon Fung, Mary Graham, and David Weil on the use of 
“targeted transparency,” which they define as “public policies that . . . mandate disclosure by 
corporations or other actors of standardized, comparable, and disaggregated information regarding 
specific products or practices to a broad audience in order to achieve a specific public policy purpose.”  
ARCHON FUNG, MARY GRAHAM & DAVID WEIL, FULL DISCLOSURE: THE PERILS AND PROMISE OF 
TRANSPARENCY 37–38 (2007) (emphasis added); see also David Weil, Targeted Transparency, in 
ADVANCING EXCELLENCE AND PUBLIC TRUST IN GOVERNMENT 77 (Cal Clark & Don-Terry Veal eds., 
2011). 
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prominent (and controversial) way of addressing international human rights 
through U.S. federal securities law.  This Article identifies and examines 
two TST regimes: (i) the “conflict minerals” provisions in § 1502 of the 
Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, which 
require the disclosure of minerals whose mining is associated with human 
rights abuses in the Democratic Republic of Congo (the Congo);5 and (ii) 
enhanced disclosure requirements mandated by § 219 of the Iran Threat 
Reduction and Syria Human Rights Act of 2012 (ITRA) on companies that 
engage in commercial activities associated with the Iranian government’s 
suppression of human rights.6  TST’s narrow scope and relatively high 
compliance costs draw attention to the following important question that is 
largely missing from public debate on international business and corporate 
social responsibility (CSR): How does social transparency address the 
needs of MNEs and other business entities operating in the global 
economy? 
To answer this question, this Article presents the concept of 
constructive discourse to identify ways that MNEs might benefit from TST 
regimes.  Drawing on the insights of constructivist political theory, 
reflexive law, and the experiences of MNEs with CSR-inspired voluntary 
reporting schemes, constructive discourse focuses on the relevance and use 
of mandatory disclosure to the firm.  Starting with the premise that MNEs 
will be increasingly subject to TST, this Article focuses on how MNEs and 
other firms can use the process and output of mandatory disclosure for their 
own benefit through constructive discourse.7  While the specific examples 
of TST in this Article address the involvement of MNEs in violations of 
international human rights, these observations and arguments may also be 
relevant to TST regimes in other areas such as environmental sustainability, 
anticorruption, and labor. 
This Article is organized as follows: Part I examines the purposes, 
applications, and limitations of social transparency through U.S. federal 
securities law.  Part II describes the recent emergence of TST and analyzes 
contemporary applications of TST with respect to the Congo and Iran.  It 
describes how TST is used as a means to address an indisputably important 
CSR objective: the complicity of MNEs in violations of international 
human rights.  Part III outlines the concept of constructive discourse as a 
framework for understanding TST, focusing on how MNEs can use 
 
 5 Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 1502, 124 
Stat. 1376 (2010) [hereinafter Dodd-Frank Act]. 
 6 Iran Threat Reduction and Syria Human Rights Act of 2012, Pub. L. No. 112-158, § 219, 126 Stat. 
1214 (2012) [hereinafter ITRA]. 
 7 This Article largely—but not entirely—sets aside questions about the public policy justifications 
of specific TST regimes, which have been addressed by other legal scholars.  See, e.g., Galit A. Sarfaty, 
Human Rights Meets Securities Regulation, 54 VA. J. INT’L L. 97 (2013) (analyzing the normative 
implications of using securities regulation to hold firms accountable for violations of human rights). 
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mandatory disclosure strategically to their benefit.  Applying the concept of 
constructive discourse, Part IV suggests and explores potential reforms to 
current TST regimes.  Finally, the Conclusion suggests potential areas for 
future normative inquiry and empirical research. 
 
II.  MANDATORY DISCLOSURE AND THE GLOBALIZATION   
OF CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY 
 
A.  The Concept of Social Transparency 
 
Information deficits occur when a firm has information regarding its 
operations—and various negative impacts and risks arising therefrom—not 
otherwise available to other parties.8  Public disclosure of a firm’s activities 
and impacts enhances social utility by providing investors, customers, 
creditors, and counterparties (i.e., users) with information necessary to 
reduce risks that they may face due to their direct or indirect interactions 
with the firm.  As famously stated by Louis Brandeis, “Sunlight is said to 
be the best of disinfectants; electric light the most efficient policeman.”9 
From the perspective of firms as disclosers, the costs of disclosure are 
proportionate to the amount, scope, and level of detail of information 
provided to users, while the benefits of disclosure decline as the amount of 
information disclosed increases.10  If private optimality converges with 
social optimality, then, everything else being equal, voluntary corporate 
disclosure will lead to the dissemination of all information that the public 
would find beneficial.11  One important source of motivation to disclose is 
reputation.  A firm’s reputation is a valuable asset that is based on public 
perceptions of what it does, how its acts, how it handles crises, and how 
well it treats stakeholders (such as, for example, its customers and local 
communities affected by its activities).12  Accordingly, firms are motivated 
by desire to strengthen their legitimacy and enhance their reputation though 
disclosure of information regarding their performance on a range of social 
issues.13  Publicly held corporations, in particular, are driven by the social 
incentives of shareholders who want firms to disclose social harms that may 
 
 8 Timothy F. Malloy, Disclosure Stories, 32 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 617, 629 (2005). 
 9 LOUIS D. BRANDEIS, OTHER PEOPLE’S MONEY AND HOW THE BANKERS USE IT 92 (1914). 
 10 See Archon Fung, Mary Graham, David Weil & Elena Fagotto, The Effectiveness of Regulatory 
Disclosure Policies, 25 J. POL’Y ANALYSIS & MGMT. 155, 161–62 (2006). 
 11  See Merritt B. Fox, Retaining Mandatory Securities Disclosure: Why Issuer Choice is Not 
Investor Empowerment, 85 VA. L. REV. 1335, 1343 (1999). 
 12  See Terry O’Callaghan, Disciplining Multinational Enterprises: The Regulatory Power of 
Reputation Risk, 21 GLOBAL SOC’Y 95, 105–07 (2007) (describing the elements of corporate reputation 
and its financial and nonfinancial value). 
 13  Archie B. Carroll & Kareem M. Shabana, The Business Case for Corporate Social Responsibility: 
A Review of Concepts, Research, and Practice, 12 INT’L J. MGMT. REV. 85, 99–100 (2010). 
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trigger penalties, liabilities, and future regulation.14 
Aside from instrumental considerations, a firm may disclose a core 
element of CSR on the basis of its commitment to transparency.15  CSR 
broadens the scope of a corporation’s obligations from a single-minded 
focus on maximizing its shareholders’ return to capital to a broader set of 
ethical, social, and environmental considerations affecting its 
stakeholders.16  Corporations may subscribe to CSR principles based on the 
perceived value of certain public goods or the social utility of certain 
values.17  Individual corporations have formulated and implemented social 
reporting processes that include disclosure as well as accounting and 
auditing of the social impacts of their activities.18 
Disclosure practices based on CSR obligations are often implemented 
through adoption of codes of conduct, statements of best practices, industry 
guidelines, and similar nonbinding instruments.19  In the past few decades, 
the CSR movement’s foundation has shifted to voluntary reporting of social 
and environmental information by MNEs that exceed legal requirements.20  
In particular, the Global Reporting Initiative (GRI), established in 1997 by 
the Coalition for Environmentally Responsible Economies (CERES), has 
become the leading industry standard for corporate social reporting.21  
Governments have amplified the proliferation of the GRI by issuing 
voluntary guidelines on CSR reporting, many of which cite, endorse, or 
recommend the GRI guidelines.22  The GRI framework requires that a 
participating company adopt a specific reporting format through which it 
 
 14  See Larry E. Ribstein, Accountability and Responsibility in Corporate Governance, 81 NOTRE 
DAME L. REV. 1431, 1445 (2006). 
 15  See Lucien J. Dhooge, Beyond Voluntarism: Social Disclosure and France’s Nouvelles 
Régulations Économiques, 21 ARIZ. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 441, 452 (2004). 
 16  See William Bradford, Beyond Good and Evil: The Commensurability of Corporate Profits and 
Human Rights, 26 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 141, 148–52 (2012). 
 17  See David W. Case, Corporate Environmental Reporting as Informational Regulation: A Law and 
Economics Perspective, 76 U. COLO. L. REV. 379, 388–90 (2005) (concerning the environment as a 
public good); Dhooge, supra note 15, at 460–61 (concerning the social utility of human rights). 
 18  See David Hess, Social Reporting: A Reflexive Law Approach to Corporate Social 
Responsiveness, 25 J. CORP. L. 41, 72–80 (1999) (examining social reporting conducted by The Body 
Shop and Ben & Jerry’s). 
 19  See David Monsma & John Buckley, Non-Financial Corporate Performance: The Material Edges 
of Social and Environmental Disclosure, 11 U. BALT. J. ENVTL. L. 151, 155–56, 159–61 (2004). 
 20  See John M. Conley & Cynthia A. Williams, Engage, Embed, and Embellish: Theory Versus 
Practice in the Corporate Social Responsibility Movement, 31 J. CORP. L. 1, 4–5 (2005). 
 21  See David Hess, The Three Pillars of Corporate Social Reporting as New Governance 
Regulation: Disclosure, Dialogue, and Development, 18 BUS. ETHICS Q. 447, 453–56 (2008) 
(summarizing the history of social reporting and the background of the GRI); Galit A. Sarfaty, 
Regulating Through Numbers: A Case Study of Corporate Sustainability Reporting, 53 VA. J. INT’L L. 
575, 590–97 (2013) (describing the emergence of the GRI as the leading standard for corporate 
sustainability reporting). 
 22  Sarfaty, supra note 21, at 600 (referring to sustainability reporting initiatives by the Australian, 
Canadian, and Japanese governments). 
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makes available to the public economic, environmental, and social 
information.23  As a result, thousands of MNEs in a broad array of 
industries are now accustomed to participating in quasi-regulatory 
initiatives based on social reporting and multistakeholder dialogues 
between MNEs, civil society groups, and governments.24 
Notwithstanding these factors, market competition and CSR 
commitments do not provide sufficient incentives to firms to voluntarily 
disclose thereby leading to the systemic underreporting of useful 
information regarding the social impacts of business activities.25  The 
potential loss of proprietary information; the exploitation of information 
regarding an MNE’s activities by its competitors, suppliers, or customers; 
and other indirect costs may discourage a socially optimal level of 
disclosure.26  Firms may choose not to voluntarily disclose due to the 
possibility of incurring civil liability.27  In addition, voluntary CSR 
reporting is often hampered by a lack of operational utility due to vague, 
undefined terms and a lack of implementation and independent monitoring 
mechanisms.28  The proliferation of different reporting standards—each 
with different applications, objectives, and biases—has led to legal and 
policy incoherence.29  In many cases, firms are able to disclose favorable 
information while concealing unfavorable information, fail to put their 
disclosures in the appropriate context, or provide false disclosures while 
avoiding investor backlash.30 
 
 
 23  See Hess, supra note 21, at 456 (summarizing the disclosure guidelines in the third edition of the 
GRI). 
 24  See Conley & Williams, supra note 20, at 11–23 (discussing the roles of participating MNEs, 
NGOs, governments, and investors); Sarfaty, supra note 21, at 597 (noting that approximately 4,000 
companies issue CSR reports, one-third of which use the GRI guidelines). 
 25  See Ribstein, supra note 14, at 1454–55 (describing why firms may lack an incentive to disclose 
negative information voluntarily); see also Zohar Goshen & Gideon Parchomovsky, The Essential Role 
of Securities Regulation, 55 DUKE L.J. 711, 756 (2006) (summarizing the justifications for mandatory 
disclosure based on the misalignment between the private and social value of firm-specific information). 
 26  Merritt B. Fox, Securities Disclosure in a Globalizing Market: Who Should Regulate Whom, 95 
MICH. L. REV. 2498, 2550–51 (1997) (identifying some of the private costs of disclosure to the firm). 
 27  See Archon Fung, David Weil, Mary Graham & Elena Fagotto, The Political Economy of 
Transparency: What Makes Disclosure Policies Effective? 16 (Ash Inst. for Democratic Governance 
and Innovation, Occasional Paper No. OP-03-04, 2004) (noting the prevalence of disclosers that 
underreport or deliberately hide risks); see also Geoffrey A. Manne, The Hydraulic Theory of 
Disclosure Regulation and Other Costs of Disclosure, 58 ALA. L. REV. 473, 483 (2007) (identifying the 
substantial litigation risk that firms face from being sued by plaintiffs’ attorneys for misrepresentations 
and omissions in their disclosure). 
 28  See Dhooge, supra note 15, at 463–64. 
 29  See Larry Catá Backer, Transparency Between Norm, Technique and Property in International 
Law and Governance: The Example of Corporate Disclosure Regimes and Environmental Impacts, 22 
MINN. J. INT’L L. 1, 50–51 (2013). 
 30  Id. at 62–63 (describing how a firm’s ownership of data makes it difficult for outsider users to 
verify or challenge CSR information disclosed by the firm); see also Hess, supra note 21, at 462–63. 
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Therefore, in order to compel reporting by firms of noneconomic 
social concerns, mandatory disclosure is often implemented.31  Throughout 
the world, government regulators have implemented mandatory disclosure 
regimes to address a wide range of social policy objectives.32  When market 
participants cannot themselves obtain such information—or can only obtain 
it by incurring undesirably high private transaction costs—and the 
information itself can further a compelling policy objective, government 
regulators may mandate disclosure.33  Several distinct factors have spurred 
demand in using mandatory disclosure to compel reporting by firms of 
noneconomic social concerns.  The increasing scope of cross-border 
business activity and growing public awareness of the social and 
geopolitical impacts of global business have coincided with calls for 
“shareholder democracy” through the exercise of shareholder rights by 
socially responsible investors (SRIs) and other investors that take interests 
in social issues.34  Civil society organizations dedicated to advancing CSR 
in the areas of human rights, the environment, and other global social issues 
have become increasingly sophisticated in applying pressure on MNEs.35  
Many stakeholders express concerns about the effectiveness and even the 
very premise of voluntary CSR-based reporting schemes.36  Instead of being 
a freestanding alternative to traditional governmental regulation, advocates 
believe that CSR practices should be viewed as a complement to 
regulation.37 
Mandatory disclosure regimes are generally premised on the 
interactive effects triggered by the obligation to disclose as shown in the 
 
 31  See Cynthia Williams, Text of Remarks on Panel: “Codes of Conduct and Transparency,” 24 
HASTINGS INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 415, 421 (2001) (suggesting that U.S. federal securities law can 
address international corporate behavior through disclosure of companies’ international actions and 
liability for misleading or incomplete disclosure). 
 32  See FUNG, GRAHAM & WEIL, supra note 4, at 74–90 (evaluating the effectiveness of corporate 
financial disclosure, restaurant hygiene quality cards, mortgage lending reporting, nutritional labeling, 
toxic release reporting, workplace hazards disclosure, patient safety disclosure, and workers’ 
notification of plant closings). 
 33  See Fung, Graham, Weil & Fagotto, supra note 10, at 156. 
 34  See Iris H-Y Chiu, Standardization in Corporate Social Responsibility Reporting and a 
Universalist Concept of CSR?—A Path Paved with Good Intentions, 22 FLA. J. INT’L L. 361, 370 (2010) 
(noting the impact of socially responsible investing on motivating social performance by corporations); 
Williams, supra note 2, at 1287–89 (noting the growing proportion of assets under professional 
management in the United States that are invested using social screening); see also Aaron A. Dhir, The 
Politics of Knowledge Dissemination: Corporate Reporting, Shareholder Voice, and Human Rights, 47 
OSGOODE HALL L.J. 47, 70–76 (2009) (arguing that social disclosure is most effective as a means of 
empowering human rights-conscious shareholders). 
 35  See Cynthia A. Williams, Civil Society Initiatives and “Soft Law” in the Oil and Gas Industry, 36 
N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 457, 466–67 (2004). 
 36  See Conley & Williams, supra note 20, at 34–36. 
 37  See Gerald F. Davis, Marina V.N. Whitman & Mayer N. Zald, The Responsibility Paradox, STAN. 
SOC. INNOVATION REV. at 37 (Winter 2008). 
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Figure 1. Disclosure Feedback Loop: Compelled Action and Discretionary Reaction 
 
Distinct functions arising out of the disclosure processes can be 
disaggregated and individually identified.38  Social transparency relies on 
ambiguous signals by third-party users of disclosed information and 
discretionary responses thereto by firms in their capacities as disclosers.39  
Mandatory disclosure may enhance the ability of users of disclosed 
information vis-à-vis disclosers by reducing information asymmetries 
between managers and shareholders, thereby lowering agency costs that 
shareholders would otherwise incur to monitor firms.40  It may improve 
corporate governance by bolstering managerial discipline insofar as 
corporate managers might act more diligently and honestly due to the 
possibility of public scrutiny of their actions.41  Mandatory disclosure may 
alter the behavior of disclosers that seek to avoid the negative reaction of 
users (e.g., investors selling off securities, customers declining to buy a 
product).  This ex ante effect may be seen in the ways that managers might 
act more diligently and honestly leading to the possibility of their actions 
 
 38  See Malloy, supra note 8, at 631–36. 
 39  Fung, Graham, Weil & Fagotto, supra note 10, at 158. 
 40  Susanna Kim Ripken, The Dangers and Drawbacks of the Disclosure Antidote: Toward a More 
Substantive Approach to Securities Regulation, 58 BAYLOR L. REV. 139, 152 (2006). 
 41  Id. at 169.  One increasingly prominent area in which mandatory disclosure regulation has been 
applied to corporate governance is executive compensation.  The Dodd-Frank Act, as part of its 
disclosure-oriented reforms, requires companies to disclose certain executive compensation incentives, 
comparative ratios between median employee and CEO compensation, and clawback provisions, among 
other information.  See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-
203, §§ 951, 953, 955, 126 Stat. 1214 (2012). 
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being subject to public scrutiny.42 
How might mandatory disclosure advance social goals?  The 
application of mandatory disclosure to social transparency involves 
“information forcing” rules whose purpose is to compel the sharing of 
information by the actor best situated to hold or obtain such information 
(i.e., the firm) to the actors most likely to use it for the public good (i.e., 
regulators and civil society).43  This information permits socially conscious 
corporate outsiders—e.g., SRIs and nongovernmental organizations 
(NGOs)—to independently monitor and scrutinize corporations’ internal 
management and decision making.44  By expressly requiring that firms 
disclose specific kinds of social impacts, mandatory disclosure compels the 
production of information that firms may otherwise not voluntarily provide.  
Using this information, investors can more accurately account for such risks 
and the market can more efficiently discount the firm’s stock price 
accordingly.45  Compared to voluntary social reporting, mandatory 
disclosure facilitates superior intercompany and interindustry comparisons 
as well as longitudinal study of a company’s success in achieving social 
objectives over time.46  Mandatory disclosure of adverse social impacts may 
have a socially beneficial effect on corporate conduct if corporate managers 
and boards seek to avoid moral disapprobation and act accordingly to avoid 
engaging in conduct that violates social norms.47  Even if disclosed 
information does not lead to any legal sanctions under U.S. federal 
securities law, issuers may seek to change their behavior if they believe that 







 42  See Ripken, supra note 40, at 151; Williams, supra note 2, at 1280. 
 43  See Christiana Ochoa & Patrick J. Keenan, Regulating Information Flows, Regulating Conflict: 
An Analysis of United States Conflict Minerals Legislation, 3 GOETTINGEN J. INT’L L. 129, 139 (2011); 
see also Goshen & Parchomovsky, supra note 25, at 758 (justifying mandatory disclosure as a means to 
reduce search costs incurred by outsiders to obtain firm-specific information). 
 44  Larry Catá Backer, On the Evolution of the United Nations’ “Protect-Respect-Remedy” Project: 
The State, the Corporation and Human Rights in a Global Governance Context, 9 SANTA CLARA J. 
INT’L L. 37, 77 (2011). 
 45  Williams, supra note 2, at 1279–80. 
 46  See Hess, supra note 18, at 67; see also Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Mandatory 
Disclosure and the Protection of Investors, 70 VA. L. REV. 669, 680 (1984) (observing that the value of 
mandatory disclosure lies in its ability to reduce informational costs by controlling the time, place, and 
manner in which firms disclose information to investors). 
 47  David A. Skeel, Jr., Shaming in Corporate Law, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 1811, 1857 (2001). 
 48  See Williams, supra note 35, at 495–96 (citing the expressive function of law and the ways that 
nonlegal mechanisms can enforce and enhance firm compliance). 
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B.  Securities Regulation and Social Transparency 
 
1.  The Scope of Mandatory Disclosure Under U.S. Securities Law 
 
One of the world’s most prominent and far reaching mandatory 
disclosure regimes is found in U.S. federal securities law.49  Its scope—
covering many of the largest and most prominent U.S. and foreign MNEs in 
the world—arguably makes it the single most influential and 
comprehensive type of business regulation.50  Mandatory disclosure is the 
core organizing principle of U.S. federal securities law.51  U.S. federal 
securities law embraces a “market discipline” approach, which seeks to 
ensure that corporate issuers disclose sufficient information so that 
investors can make their own decisions.52 
Mandatory disclosure under U.S. federal securities law is generally 
governed by the Securities Act of 1933 (the Securities Act) and the 
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (the Exchange Act).53  The Securities Act 
governs the disclosure requirements related to the issuance of securities in 
primary markets, primarily by requiring firms that wish to sell securities in 
the U.S. market to register with the SEC through the submission of a 
publicly available registration statement.54  The Exchange Act governs the 
trading of securities in secondary markets and imposes ongoing disclosure 
requirements on companies through the filing of periodic reports with the 
SEC that are made available to the public.55  Both registration statements 
 
 49  See Fung, Graham, Weil & Fagotto, supra note 10, at 167, 169 (characterizing corporate financial 
disclosure as an example of a highly effective transparency system); see also David Hess, Social 
Reporting and New Governance Regulation: The Prospects of Achieving Corporate Accountability 
Through Transparency, 17 BUS. ETHICS Q. 453, 461 (2007). 
 50  Foreign companies that sell securities in the U.S. markets are subject to disclosure requirements 
under U.S. federal securities law generally equivalent to U.S.-based issuers, notwithstanding the fact 
that such foreign companies may not be subject to other U.S. laws.  See Amy Deen Westbrook, Sunlight 
on Iran: How Reductive Standards of Materiality Excuse Incomplete Disclosure Under the Securities 
Laws, 7 HASTINGS BUS. L.J. 13, 18 (2011). 
 51  See Steven M. Davidoff & Claire A. Hill, Limits of Disclosure, 36 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 599, 605–
06 (2013). 
 52  U.S. federal securities law operates in conjunction with state “blue-sky” securities laws, which, in 
contrast, are “merit-based”—i.e., they provide state-level government regulators with the authority to 
judge the soundness of securities.  Although state blue-sky securities laws still apply to many types of 
securities transactions, their scope has been significantly curtailed.  Westbrook, supra note 50, at 18 
n.17 (citing and referring to the National Securities Markets Improvement Act of 1996 § 102, 15 U.S.C. 
§ 77r(b)(1)(A)). 
 53  See Williams, supra note 2, at 1209–35 (summarizing the legislative context and history of the 
Securities Act and the Exchange Act). 
 54  Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77a (2009). 
 55  Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78a (2012).  Exchange Act reporting requirements 
apply to any company that has at least 500 shareholders and $10 million in assets, has made a registered 
public offering of securities in the United States, or has listed securities on a U.S. stock exchange 
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under the Securities Act and periodic reports under the Exchange Act must 
include extensive information regarding an issuer’s management, risks, 
operations, and financial condition, among other information.56  Moreover, 
the Exchange Act includes powerful antifraud provisions that impose 
standards on the veracity and completeness of mandatory disclosure.  Most 
notably among them is § 10(b), which subjects an Exchange Act reporting 
company to civil liability for material omissions or misrepresentations in 
periodic reports filed with the SEC or any other document or information 
released by the company.57  Rule 10b-5, promulgated under § 10(b), is one 
of the foundations of the disclosure-based regulatory approach of U.S. 
federal securities law.58  Another source of liability is § 18(a), which 
establishes an express private cause of action against any person that makes 
a false and misleading filing.59 
Until recently, social transparency has been very limited in U.S. 
federal securities law.  Historically, disclosure of the adverse social impacts 
of a company’s activities was required only where such disclosure would be 
necessary to protect investors’ financial interests.  The mandatory 
disclosure obligation under U.S. federal securities law is circumscribed by 
the principle of materiality.  Under this principle, a company must only 
disclose a given piece of information if there is a substantial likelihood that 
a reasonable investor would deem it significant in the “total mix” of 
available information—i.e., what an ordinary, rational investor would 
 
(hereinafter an Exchange Act reporting company).  See id. §§ 12(a), 12(g)(1), 13(a), 15(d). 
 56  The broad, open-ended scope of the periodic reporting requirements under § 13 of the Exchange 
Act have proven to be fertile ground for TST as described later in this Article.  See infra Part II.B. 
 57  Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act requires that a plaintiff prove that a defendant made a material 
omission or misrepresentation connected with the purchase or sale of a security with scienter causing 
economic loss to the plaintiff due to reliance on that omission or misrepresentation.  See Exchange Act § 
10(b) (codified at 15 U.S.C § 78j(b) (2010)). 
 58  Rule 10b-5 provides the following: 
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any means or 
instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails or of any facility of any national 
securities exchange, 
(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud, 
(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a material fact 
necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of the circumstances 
under which they were made, not misleading, or 
(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or would 
operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in connection with the purchase or sale of 
any security. 
17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2010) (emphasis added). 
 59  Under § 18(a), a plaintiff must demonstrate that he or she purchased the securities in reliance on a 
false or misleading filing and suffered damages directly as a result.  Further, a defendant is not liable for 
any false or misleading statement in a filed document if the defendant can establish that it acted in good 
faith and had no knowledge that the statement was false or misleading.  See Exchange Act § 18(a) 
(codified at 15 U.S.C § 78r(a) (2010)). 
_JD_Park Final Read _1.28.15.docx (DO NOT DELETE) 3/12/15  7:52 AM 
Targeted Social Transparency as Global Corporate Strategy 
35:87 (2014) 
99 
consider important information in an arm’s length securities transaction.60  
Consequently, under this principle, companies are only required to disclose 
those social impacts that constitute a material business risk to the company 
itself.61 
Regulation S-K, which specifies what information Exchange Act 
reporting companies must disclose in their periodic filings to the SEC, 
reflects this risk-oriented approach to disclosure.62  Regulation S-K requires 
companies to disclose in their annual, quarterly, and other periodic reports 
certain risks including, inter alia, (i) material costs and other effects of 
compliance with law, including “any risks attendant to [their] foreign 
operations”;63 (ii) material pending legal proceedings;64 and (iii) 
management’s discussion of material trends, events, and uncertainties that 
are reasonably expected to have material effects on its operations, liquidity, 
or capital resources.65 
In 2010, the SEC issued an interpretive release that clarified the 
applicability of securities disclosure requirements to climate change risks.66  
The SEC’s guidance applied the principle of materiality by affirming that 
Exchange Act reporting companies are required to disclose climate change 
impacts and risks only to the extent that there is a clear and quantitatively 
material effect on the company's business.67  The SEC has eschewed bright-
line disclosure requirements in respect to social and environmental risks in 
favor of permitting companies to avoid disclosing such impacts on the basis 
that their costs are relatively small, ambiguous, or both.68  This narrow 
approach has been criticized for failing to address the range of social 
concerns that do not meet the materiality requirement and for disregarding 
circumstances in which social concerns may later become economic 
concerns.69  While the SEC continues to evaluate the implementation of a 
generalized social transparency regime under U.S. federal securities law, its 
realization remains far from imminent.70 
 
 
 60  See TSC Indus. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 449 (1976); see also Westbrook, supra note 50, 
at 26–27; Williams, supra note 2, at 1208–09. 
 61  See Benjamin J. Richardson, Enlisting Institutional Investors in Environmental Regulation: Some 
Comparative and Theoretical Perspectives, 28 N.C. J. INT’L L. & COM. REG. 247, 352–53 (2002). 
 62  Regulation S-K consists of administrative rules adopted by the U.S. Securities and Exchange 
Commission in 1982.  See 17 C.F.R. § 229.101 (2010). 
 63  Id. § 229.101(d)(3); § 229.101 (Item 101). 
 64  Id. § 229.103 (Item 103). 
 65  Id. § 229.303 (Item 303). 
 66  Commission Guidance Regarding Disclosure Related to Climate Change, Securities Act Release 
No. 9106, Exchange Act Release No. 61,469, 75 Fed. Reg. 6290 (Feb. 8, 2010). 
 67  See Westbrook, supra note 50, at 44–55. 
 68  See id. at 59. 
 69  See id. at 70–71, 74. 
 70  See Sarfaty, supra note 21, at 602–03. 
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2.  Shortcomings of Social Transparency Under U.S. Securities 
Law 
 
The effectiveness of social transparency is hampered by a range of 
factors endemic to mandatory disclosure regulation.  As described below, 
social transparency regimes based on mandatory disclosure may fall short 
of their objectives due to (i) weak compliance effects on disclosers, (ii) 
inconsistent informational value to users, and (iii) uncertain or even 
perverse incentives on disclosers. 
First, mandatory disclosure may not sufficiently deter misconduct or 
incentivize virtuous behavior by firms.  Since social transparency does not 
enforce substantive standards of behavior per se, its ability to positively 
affect business behavior depends on the capacity and willingness of the 
public to use and respond to disclosed information.71  Therefore, the impact 
of social transparency relies on the ability of users of disclosed information 
to affect the interests of firms and the ability of firms to detect changes in 
user behavior.72  However, disclosure in itself may not sufficiently persuade 
them of the need to change their modus operandi.73  Ambiguous disclosure 
rules permit companies to engage in strategic noncompliance by disputing 
the applicability of a disclosure obligation and refusing to comply.74 
Notwithstanding the prospect of civil enforcement, social transparency 
is arguably predicated on a moral community in which members share 
common values such that firms bear the reputational effects of disclosed 
information on the adverse social impacts of their activities.75  This may 
pose a particular problem in respect to the activities of MNEs operating in 
global, multicultural business environments where there may not be 
universally held social values.76  If MNEs have weak ties to a community 
and stakeholders do not have the capacity to react to disclosed information 
in the form of a social demand, then the deterrence value of any perceived 
 
 71  See Karen E. Woody, Conflict Minerals Legislation: The SEC’s New Role as Diplomatic and 
Humanitarian Watchdog, 81 FORDHAM. L. REV. 1315, 1344 (2012). 
 72  Fung, Graham, Weil & Fagotto, supra note 10, at 164–65 (describing how mandatory disclosure 
regulation can incentivize disclosers to change their decision making based on the responses of users to 
disclosed information). 
 73  For example, the “adopt-or-disclose” approach of many of the corporate governance reforms 
enacted by the Sarbanes-Oxley Act merely gives corporations the option either to comply with a 
substantive rule or disclose their noncompliance.  Ripken, supra note 40, at 144.  See Sarbanes-Oxley 
Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (2002). 
 74  Malloy, supra note 8, at 625. 
 75  See Dan M. Kahan & Eric A. Posner, Shaming White-Collar Criminals: A Proposal for Reform of 
the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 42 J.L. & ECON. 365, 380 (1999) (noting the role of punishment as 
an expression of a community’s values). 
 76  See Andrew K. Woods, A Behavioral Approach to Human Rights, 51 HARV. INT’L L.J. 51, 77–78 
(2010) (observing that the effectiveness of shaming as a means of enforcing international human rights 
norms depends on the existence of a social context that will enable the shame to occur). 
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moral disapproval might be commensurately weak.77  The weaknesses of 
social sanctions may similarly apply to investors, who may be insulated 
from their effects.78 
Second, the ability of mandatory disclosure to ensure a socially 
optimal level of regulation is premised on the veracity of the efficient 
market hypothesis, which assumes that investors are fully rational and make 
collectively optimal decisions.79  However, on a collective level, investors 
may not be able to influence corporations’ behavior due to collective action 
problems.80  Likewise, on an individual level, the analytical and structural 
problems that often impair investors’ ability to use disclosed information 
have been the subject of considerable scholarly attention.81  The intended 
beneficiaries of mandatory disclosure may be impaired, inter alia, by 
information overload, overconfidence, overoptimistic outlooks, and 
confirmation bias, all of which may affect both sophisticated and 
unsophisticated investors alike.82  Indeed, even investors that are aware of 
such biases nonetheless find it difficult to undo such biasing influences.83  
The disclosure of analytically complex transactions presents particularly 
vexing cognitive problems resulting in oversimplification, 
incomprehensibility, and ambiguity.84  Further, the logistical complexity of 
organizing, sorting, and comparing enormous amounts of disclosed 
information may hamper the investors’ ability to utilize information that 
they are otherwise capable of assessing.85  Depending on the nature of the 
 
 77  See Hope M. Babcock, Corporate Environmental Social Responsibility: Corporate 
“Greenwashing” or a Corporate Culture Game Changer?, 21 FORDHAM ENVTL. L. REV. 1, 46 (2010).  
However, the effectiveness of reputational sanctions in respect of social impacts such as international 
human rights may arguably be greater due to the tangible effects of corporate harms on vulnerable 
individuals and groups.  See MARGARET E. KECK & KATHRYN SIKKINK, ACTIVISTS BEYOND BORDERS: 
ADVOCACY NETWORKS IN INTERNATIONAL POLITICS 204–05 (1998) (arguing that norms involving 
prevention of bodily harm for vulnerable groups are more influential); Kevin T. Jackson, The Normative 
Logic of Global Economic Governance: In Pursuit of Non-Instrumental Justification for the Rule of Law 
and Human Rights, 22 MINN. J. INT’L L. 71, 125 (2013) (referring to the reputational ramifications of 
corporate malfeasance connected with basic human rights as “moral felonies”). 
 78  See Einer Elhauge, Sacrificing Corporate Profits in the Public Interest, 80 N.Y.U. L. REV. 733, 
798–99 (2005) (noting the insulation of corporate shareholders caused by their lack of information about 
the effects of a corporation's negative conduct on society). 
 79  Robert A. Prentice, Moral Equilibrium: Stock Brokers and the Limits of Disclosure, 2011 WIS. L. 
REV. 1059, 1065 (2011). 
 80  See Elhauge, supra note 78, at 799 (arguing that dispersed public shareholders do not act on moral 
or social norms even if individual shareholders believe they are important).  But see Ribstein, supra note 
14, at 1449–50 (challenging Elhauge’s assumption that shareholders will disregard social incentives). 
 81  See Fung, Graham, Weil & Fagotto, supra note 10, at 158. 
 82  See Ripken, supra note 40, at 160–76, 181–82. 
 83  Prentice, supra note 79, at 1080. 
 84  See Steven L. Schwarcz, Rethinking the Disclosure Paradigm in a World of Complexity, 2004 U. 
ILL. L. REV. 1, 11–17 (2004). 
 85  See Robert P. Bartlett, III, Inefficiencies in the Information Thicket: A Case Study of Derivative 
Disclosures During the Financial Crisis, 36 J. CORP. L. 1, 55–56 (2010).  But see Davidoff & Hill, 
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adverse social impacts at issue, social transparency regimes may be 
similarly hindered by these cognitive shortcomings. 
Third, mandatory disclosure may fail due to perverse or otherwise less 
socially desirable incentives to disclosers.  Absent a fiduciary obligation 
above and beyond disclosure, the very act of disclosing may free corporate 
agents to act in even more self-interested ways by allowing them to 
rationalize their behavior as morally justified.86  Similarly, firms may 
satisfy disclosure requirements while seeking to minimize changes in their 
substantive behavior.87  A related concern arises from the possibility that 
unwanted conduct deterred by mandatory disclosure may lead to the worst 
of unintended consequences: a shift to even less desirable conduct.88  A 
regulatory focus on one set of risks may create incentives for companies to 
shift their behavior towards other equally or more risky practices, or other 
jurisdictions that are not regulated by mandatory disclosure.89 
 
 III.  TARGETED SOCIAL TRANSPARENCY AS A  
REGULATORY TECHNIQUE 
 
A.  The Emergence of TST 
 
A new genus of social transparency has recently emerged.  Targeted 
social transparency, or TST, consists of mandatory disclosure regulation 
that is crafted for the purpose of addressing noneconomic public policy 
objectives specific to individual countries, regions, or industries.  TST 
represents both an evolution of social transparency as well as a major 
departure from generalized, broad-based social transparency regimes.  In 
comparison to other forms of social transparency, TST’s use of sharply 
focused disclosure requirements permits legislators and regulators to use 
disclosure for narrowly defined ends.  Unlike Regulation S-K and other 
reporting requirements under U.S. federal securities law, TST regimes 
address narrowly defined social objectives through mandatory disclosure of 
specific nonfinancial information for the benefit of a range of noninvestor 
stakeholders.  In contrast to the materiality standard governing Regulation 
S-K, mandatory disclosure under TST is triggered by explicit statutory and 
 
supra note 51, at 628–29 (asserting that securities disclosure provides sufficient notice to sophisticated 
investors). 
 86  See Prentice, supra note 79, at 1101–02. 
 87  David Weil, Mary Graham & Archon Fung, Targeting Transparency, 340 SCIENCE 1410, 1411 
(2013). 
 88  Manne, supra note 27, at 485–86. 
 89  See Weil, Graham & Fung, supra note 87, at 1411.  The potential for this kind of risk-shifting 
behavior is a potential problem in respect of TST.  See infra text accompanying note 146 (citing 
concerns that conflict minerals disclosure might simply incentivize MNEs to source these goods from 
other non-TST regulated jurisdictions). 
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regulatory requirements that are themselves based on social objectives. 
 The emergence of TST reflects the convergence of several interrelated 
factors in global governance, CSR, and financial regulation.90  First, cross-
border financial activity, international trade, and foreign direct investment 
have led to a growing awareness of the powerful role of corporations as 
global actors.91  However, governments and MNEs have largely rejected the 
implementation of substantive requirements on global corporate conduct 
through international legal instruments.  The failure of the UN Norms on 
the Responsibilities of Transnational Corporations and Other Business 
Enterprises with Regard to Human Rights exemplifies the lack of consensus 
on the legal obligations of private nonstate actors.92  Private rights of action 
against MNEs in domestic courts for violations of human rights, 
environmental, and labor standards are relatively narrow and limited.93  As 
the need for cross-border governance increases while international legal 
reform remains stagnant, social transparency regimes provide an appealing 
means of addressing global problems.94 
Second, TST also seeks to address the shortcomings of the New 
Governance model of regulation exemplified by the GRI and other 
voluntary reporting schemes.  New Governance regulation emerged as a 
counterpoint to traditional top-down, command and control regulation 
dictated by government agencies.95  Regulatory schemes based on New 
Governance principles adopt a participatory approach that embraces 
flexibility, experimentalism, localism, and reflective self-regulation.96  New 
Governance-based securities regulation features communication 
mechanisms between regulators and firms to promote industry-based 
 
 90  A thorough descriptive analysis of the historical antecedents to TST is beyond the scope of this 
Article.  Nevertheless, the following discussion identifies and briefly explores the political and 
economic circumstances that have enabled the recent emergence of TST regimes. 
 91  See Steven R. Ratner, Corporations and Human Rights: A Theory of Legal Responsibility, 111 
YALE L.J. 443, 461–65 (2001) (outlining the growing need and difficulty of attaching human rights 
responsibility on corporations). 
 92  See Norms on the Responsibilities of Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises 
with Regard to Human Rights, Sub-Comm’n on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights, 55th 
Sess., Aug. 26, 2003, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/2003/12/Rev.2 (2003) [hereinafter UN Norms]; see also 
Carlos M. Vázquez, Direct vs. Indirect Obligations of Corporations Under International Law, 43 
COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 927 (2005) (analyzing the shift in how international law regulates private 
corporations marked by the UN norms). 
 93  The Supreme Court’s decision in Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 133 S. Ct. 1659 (2013), 
substantially reduced the scope of the Alien Tort Statute (ATS) by excluding cases involving purely 
extraterritorial conduct.  The ATS, which allows U.S. district courts to hear “any civil action by an alien 
for a tort only, committed in violation of the law of nations,” has been a highly celebrated (or much 
decried) jurisdictional basis for foreign plaintiffs to seek redress against multinational corporations for 
violations of international human rights law committed in foreign countries.  28 U.S.C. § 1350 (1789). 
 94  FUNG, GRAHAM & WEIL, supra note 4, at 128. 
 95  Dhir, supra note 34, at 58. 
 96  See Hess, supra note 49, at 454–55. 
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learning within broad policy guidelines and regulatory goals.97 
However, strategic behavior by MNEs has led to growing 
dissatisfaction with the GRI and similar corporate reporting schemes.98  
Social reporting, without regulatory oversight and enforcement, becomes a 
ritualistic practice that fails to meaningfully change firm behavior.99  The 
threat of state regulation is often an insufficient means of compelling 
adherence with CSR norms.100  This has spurred commentators to propose 
external monitoring schemes that assess and enforce implementation of 
New Governance principles.101  TST, in this important respect, constitutes a 
huge step forward.  By expressly and explicitly adopting social objectives 
within the mandatory disclosure framework of U.S. federal securities law, 
TST imposes greater control on the content and format of disclosed 
information in order to ensure that it addresses public goals.102  TST 
regimes enforce an affirmative obligation to disclose with the threat of 
antifraud liability under the Exchange Act.103 
 
 97  See Cristie L. Ford, New Governance, Compliance, and Principles-Based Securities Regulation, 
45 AM. BUS. L.J. 1, 28 (2008).  Along similar lines, mandatory disclosure embraces the concept of 
“regulation by information” by requiring MNEs to produce information that they can use to review, 
benchmark, and improve their own social performance.  See FUNG, GRAHAM & WEIL, supra note 4, at 
130; see also ANNE-MARIE SLAUGHTER, A NEW WORLD ORDER 186–88, 193 (2004) (describing 
regulation by information as governance premised on governments providing information to let 
individuals regulate themselves). 
 98  See Chiu, supra note 34, at 376–92 (arguing that standardization and convergence in CSR 
reporting have led to weak and uncritical market-based governance); Tracey M. Roberts, Innovations in 
Governance: A Functional Typology of Private Governance Institutions, 22 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 
F. 67, 136–37 (2011) (noting how competition between private governance schemes for corporate 
participants frequently leads to lower minimum standards). 
 99  See Sarfaty, supra note 21, at 608 (characterizing voluntary CSR reporting as “transparency for its 
own sake rather than actual improvements in behavior”); Wendy E. Wagner, Imagining Corporate 
Sustainability as a Public Good Rather Than a Corporate Bad, 46 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 561, 567 
(2011) (noting how a good score in the GRI may become an end in itself); Williams, supra note 35, at 
501 (cautioning against disclosure as an end in itself). 
 100  Cf. Thomas Risse, Governance Under Limited Sovereignty, in BACK TO BASICS: STATE POWER 
IN A CONTEMPORARY WORLD 93 (Martha Finnemore & Judith Goldstein eds., 2013) (noting the 
voluntary implementation of CSR practices by MNEs). 
 101  See Sean D. Murphy, Taking Multinational Corporate Codes of Conduct to the Next Level, 43 
COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 389, 431–32 (2005) (proposing that governments promote oversight of 
MNEs’ compliance with voluntary codes of conduct through the licensing of nongovernmental 
monitors); Ratner, supra note 91, at 533 (referring to efforts by NGOs and labor unions to include 
procedures for independent monitoring of corporate codes of conduct). 
 102  See Hess, supra note 21, at 467–68 (proposing mandatory social reporting to reduce strategic 
reporting by MNEs); Shane M. Shelley, Entrenched Managers & Corporate Social Responsibility, 111 
PENN ST. L. REV. 107, 128–29 (2006) (arguing that mandatory disclosure of CSR impacts reduces the 
“gaming” of social responsibility performance). 
 103  See Rachel Cherington, Securities Laws and Corporate Social Responsibility: Toward an 
Expanded Use of Rule 10b-5, 25 U. PA. J. INT’L ECON. L. 1439, 1464 (2004) (observing that in the 
absence of an express obligation to disclose social and environmental activities under U.S. federal 
securities law, corporations can simply choose not to disclose information about their overseas 
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Finally, TST reflects the appeal of extraterritorial regulation.  
Traditionally, U.S. federal securities law was based on the presumption that 
a country’s laws apply only to acts or events occurring within its 
territory.104  Increasingly, domestic law has been extended to regulate 
conduct outside of the United States notwithstanding recent U.S. Supreme 
Court decisions that have limited extraterritoriality.105  U.S. federal 
securities law has been at the forefront of this phenomenon.  Perhaps the 
most prominent application of extraterritorial regulation in U.S. federal 
securities law is the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA), which imposes 
civil liability and criminal sanctions on U.S. persons as well as foreign 
Exchange Act reporting companies for bribery of foreign government 
officials even when such acts occurred offshore.106  Similarly, the Dodd-
Frank Act applies extraterritorial regulation in a range of areas.107 
 
B.  Examples of TST in U.S. Federal Securities Law 
 
Although nascent in its current form, the implications of TST are 
already the subject of intense debate.  U.S. federal securities law has begun  
embracing TST as a means of furthering foreign policy objectives in the 
area of international human rights.  The following discussion examines two 
contrasting examples of TST in U.S. federal securities law to date: (i) 
“conflict minerals” reporting under § 1502 of the Dodd-Frank Act, and (ii) 
enhanced Iran-related reporting requirements mandated by § 219 of the Iran 
Threat Reduction and Syria Human Rights Act of 2012. 
 
operations in order to avoid Rule 10b-5 liability). 
 104  See CHRIS BRUMMER, SOFT LAW AND THE GLOBAL FINANCIAL SYSTEM: RULE MAKING IN THE 
21ST CENTURY 33–35 (2012); see also EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244, 248 (1991) 
(acknowledging the presumption against extraterritoriality as a principle of statutory interpretation). 
 105  See Austen L. Parrish, Reclaiming International Law from Extraterritoriality, 93 MINN. L. REV. 
815, 846–49 (2009) (citing the use of extraterritoriality in antitrust, securities regulation, various areas 
of intellectual property law, corporate law, bankruptcy, tax criminal law, environmental law, civil rights, 
and labor law).  In 2010, the Supreme Court rejected the extraterritorial application of Rule 10b-5 in so-
called “f-cubed” lawsuits—i.e., securities fraud claims against foreign defendants by foreign plaintiffs 
who bought their securities outside the United States.  See Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank, 130 S. Ct. 
2869 (2010).  The Dodd-Frank Act subsequently reaffirmed federal jurisdiction over such Rule 10b-5 
suits brought by the SEC and the U.S. Department of Justice.  See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and 
Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 929P(b), 124 Stat. 1376 (2010). 
 106  See Pub. L. No. 95-213, 91 Stat. 1494 (1977) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-1 to -2 
(2006)); see also Woody, supra note 71, at 1342–43 (comparing the FCPA and the Dodd-Frank Act). 
 107  See Sean J. Griffith, Substituted Compliance and Systemic Risk: How to Make a Global Market 
in Derivatives Regulation, 98 MINN. L. REV. 1291, 1330–35 (2014) (describing the assertion of broad 
extraterritorial regulatory authority by the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) in respect 
of swaps activities); Stephen Kim Park, Guarding the Guardians: The Case for Regulating State-Owned 
Financial Entities in Global Finance, 16 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 739, 771–76 (2014) (examining the CFTC’s 
extraterritorial regulation of swaps specifically in respect of international financial institutions and other 
state-owned financial entities). 
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1.  Conflict Minerals Disclosure Under the Dodd-Frank Act 
 
The “conflict minerals” provisions in § 1502 of the Dodd-Frank Act 
(DFA § 1502) require Exchange Act reporting companies to disclose to the 
SEC their internal measures to exercise due diligence and chain of custody 
of minerals mined in the Congo or adjacent countries which have 
historically been linked to civil strife, human rights abuses, and violence.108 
The overarching purpose of DFA § 1502 is evident in its prologue, which 
expressly states that it is intended to address “the exploitation and trade of 
conflict minerals originating in the Democratic Republic of the Congo [that 
are used to help] finance conflict characterized by extreme levels of 
violence in the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo, particularly 
sexual- and gender-based violence, [that contribute] to an emergency 
humanitarian situation therein . . . .”109  The human rights impact of conflict 
minerals directly and indirectly involves business.  For example, local 
mining companies and their security providers are directly involved in 
human rights abuses such as forced labor.110  Further, an array of 
companies—both locally based and MNEs—that buy, trade, transport, 
process, and finance the purchase of conflict minerals may fund and thereby 
perpetuate the conflict in the Congo.111  DFA § 1502 seeks to restrict 
funding sources for armed groups in the Congo through the dissemination 
of information about the connection between their commercial activity and 
human rights violations.112 
Under DFA § 1502, an Exchange Act reporting company must 
disclose in a new specialized disclosure report filed with the SEC whether 
any conflict minerals that are “necessary to the functionality or production 
of a product manufactured by such [company]” originated in the Congo or 
any country that shares an internationally recognized border with the Congo 
(i.e., Angola, Burundi, Central African Republic, Rwanda, Sudan, 
Tanzania, Uganda, and Zambia).113  It designates columbite-tantalite 
(coltan), cassiterite, gold, or wolframite (or any of their respective 
 
 108  Dodd-Frank Act § 1502(b) (amending § 13 by adding a new subsection (p)). 
 109  Dodd-Frank Act § 1502(a). 
 110  See Laura E. Seay, What's Wrong with Dodd-Frank 1502? Conflict Minerals, Civilian 
Livelihoods, and the Unintended Consequences of Western Advocacy (Ctr. for Global Dev., Working 
Paper No. 284, 2012), available at http://www.cgdev.org/sites/default/files/1425843_file_Seay_ 
Dodd_Frank_FINAL.pdf. 
 111  Ochoa & Keenan, supra note 43, at 131–33. 
 112  See id. at 134, 137–38; see also Conflict Minerals Final Rule, 77 Fed. Reg. 56,274, 56,276 (Sept. 
12, 2012) (codified at 17 C.F.R. §§ 240, 249B) (citing statement of Senator Russ Feingold, one of its 
cosponsors). 
 113  15 U.S.C. §§ 78m(p)(1)(A), (2); see also Conflict Minerals Final Rule, 77 Fed. Reg. at 56,280 
(describing a new SEC form for such disclosure, Form SD). 
_JD_Park Final Read _1.28.15.docx (DO NOT DELETE) 3/12/15  7:52 AM 
Targeted Social Transparency as Global Corporate Strategy 
35:87 (2014) 
107 
derivatives) as conflict minerals if sourced from the Congo or contiguous 
countries.114  These minerals are typically acquired by MNEs indirectly 
through intermediaries for use in manufacturing a wide range of products— 
most notably consumer electronics.115  If an Exchange Act reporting 
company determines that it uses one or more minerals designated by DFA 
§ 1502 either to manufacture a product or any such mineral is contained in a 
company manufactured product itself, then it must comply with DFA 
§ 1502.116  There is no exception for de minimis use of conflict minerals nor 
grandfathering for any companies, products, or industries.117  Most 
importantly, disclosure under DFA § 1502 is not subject to the materiality 
standard.118 
If an Exchange Act reporting company determines that it uses one or 
more conflict minerals, it must follow a multistep disclosure and due 
diligence process.  First, the company must conduct a reasonable country of 
origin inquiry into their source of origin.119  Upon completing this inquiry, 
if the company has determined that it uses conflict minerals, it must 
(i) exercise due diligence on “the source and chain of custody” of the 
conflict minerals, and (ii) arrange an independent private sector audit on the 
source and chain of custody of the conflict minerals through its supply 
chain and disclose a summary of the results thereof.120  On the basis of 
these additional measures, as applicable, the company must disclose 
whether or not it uses conflict minerals and describe the measures that it has 
taken on Form SD.121 
 
 
 114  Dodd-Frank Act § 1502(e)(4)(A).  These minerals are commonly referred to as “3TG” (tin, 
tantalum, tungsten, and gold) in the mining industry. 
 115  See Celia R. Taylor, Conflict Minerals and SEC Disclosure Regulation, 2 HARV. BUS. L. REV. 
ONLINE 105, 107 (2012). 
 116  In addition, there is an exception for a company that uses conflict minerals from recycled and 
scrap sources even if they were originally sourced from the Congo.  See Conflict Minerals Final Rule, 
77 Fed. Reg. at 56,332 (codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 240, 249b (2012)). 
 117  Conflict Minerals Final Rule, 77 Fed. Reg. at 56,298 (codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 240, 249b 
(2012)) (declining to include a de minimis exception through SEC rulemaking). 
 118  See Conflict Minerals Proposed Rule, 75 Fed. Reg. 80,948, 80,960 (Dec. 23, 2010) (stating that 
nature and purpose of DFA § 1502 is “qualitatively different from the nature and purpose of the 
disclosure of information that has been required under the periodic reporting provisions of the Exchange 
Act”); see also Woody, supra note 71, at 1340–42 (criticizing the absence of a materiality requirement 
in DFA Section 1502). 
 119  See 15 U.S.C. § 78m(p)(1)(A)(i)-(ii). 
 120  Id. 
 121  In addition to filing Form SD, the company must attach a separate, more detailed Conflict 
Minerals Report as an exhibit to Form SD.  Conflict Minerals Final Rule, 77 Fed. Reg. at 56,302 
(codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 240, 249b (2012)).  The Conflict Minerals Report must include “a description 
of the measures taken by the person to exercise due diligence on the source and chain of custody of such 
[conflict] minerals, which measures shall include an independent private sector audit of such report.”  15 
U.S.C. § 78m(p)(1)(A)(i). 
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2.  Human Rights Disclosure Under the Iran Threat Reduction and 
Syria Human Rights Act 
 
Another example of SEC mandatory disclosure expressly justified by 
human rights objectives is found in the Iran Threat Reduction and Syria 
Human Rights Act of 2012 (ITRA).  ITRA builds upon a series of U.S. 
laws and executive orders that impose sanctions against Iran.122  The U.S. 
sanctions regime against Iran has been motivated by a variety of concerns 
over the Iranian government’s nuclear program and proliferation thereof, 
support for international terrorist organizations, and human rights abuses. 
ITRA, in particular, implements a range of new measures relating to 
human rights abuses in Iran.123  Such measures include the following: (i) 
requiring the President to report on the inclusion of Iranian political leaders 
as human rights abusers subject to sanctions;124 (ii) imposition of sanctions 
on persons that knowingly provide Iran, the Iranian government, or for use 
in Iran, any goods or technologies likely to be used to commit serious 
human rights abuses against the people of Iran (e.g., firearms and 
ammunition, rubber bullets, chemical sprays, electroshock weapons, and 
surveillance technology);125 and (iii) imposition of sanctions against 
persons who engage in censorship or assist others in the impairment of 
freedom of expression in Iran.126 
Within this broad mandate, § 219 of ITRA (ITRA § 219) imposes new 
reporting requirements on Exchange Act reporting companies to assist the 
U.S. government in executing ITRA’s human rights-based sanctions.127  
ITRA § 219 amends § 13 of the Exchange Act by requiring Exchange Act 
reporting companies to disclose any information concerning, inter alia, 
their assistance in the transfer of goods or technologies, or the provision of 
services, that are likely to be used by the Iranian government to commit 
serious human rights abuses.128  If an Exchange Act reporting company has 
“knowingly engaged” in such activity, then it must include in its quarterly 
 
 122  See Iran and Libya Sanctions Act of 1996, Pub. L. 104-172, 110 Stat. 1541 (1996) (codified as 
amended at 50 U.S.C. § 1701); Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment Act 
(CISADA) of 2010, Pub. L. 111-195, 124 Stat. 1312 (2010).  In addition, regulations promulgated by 
the Department of Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) restrict trade, investment, and 
financial activities with Iran by U.S. persons.  See Westbrook, supra note 50, at 47–50. 
 123  See Iran Threat Reduction and Syria Human Rights Act of 2012, Pub. L. No. 112-158, §§ 401–
403, 411–415, 126 Stat. 1214 (2012). 
 124  Id. § 401 (amending § 105 of CISADA). 
 125  Id. § 402 (adding a new § 105A to CISADA). 
 126  Id. § 403 (adding a new § 105B to CISADA). 
 127  ITRA § 219 went into effect on February 6, 2013.  See id. § 219(b) (amending § 13 by adding a 
new subsection (r)); see also SEC, Compliance and Disclosure Interpretations, Section 147, Section 
13(r), Questions 147.01 and 147.02 (Dec. 4, 2012), available at http://www.sec.gov/divisions/corpfin/ 
guidance/exchangeactsections-interps.htm. 
 128  15 U.S.C. § 78m(r)(1)(C)). 
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or annual filing to the SEC information concerning the nature and extent of 
the activity, any gross revenues and net profits attributable to the activity, 
and whether it or any affiliate intends to continue the activity.129  Like DFA 
§ 1502, there is no de minimis exception to ITRA § 219 disclosure 
requirements.130  Further, an Exchange Act reporting company must 
concurrently file a separate notice of disclosure with the SEC, which upon 
receipt by the SEC shall be transmitted to the President and Congress.131  
The President is required to initiate an investigation to determine within 
180 days whether sanctions should be imposed on the Exchange Act 
reporting company (or its affiliate) on the basis of the ITRA § 219 
disclosure.132 
 
3.  Comparing and Contrasting Approaches to TST 
 
DFA § 1502 and ITRA § 219 constitute two examples of TST under 
U.S. federal securities law currently in effect.133  Other applications of TST 
follow similar approaches.  Section 1504 of the Dodd-Frank Act, the 
counterpart to DFA § 1502, requires oil, gas, and mining companies to 
disclose certain payments made to governments for the commercial 
development of natural resources.134  Its status remains uncertain.135  A TST 
regime targeted at North Korea and modeled on ITRA § 219 is pending in 
Congress.136  Other countries have recently enacted, or are considering 
 
 129  Id. § 78m(r)(2). 
 130  See Brian Breheny, Section 13(r) Disclosure Guidance for Public Companies, HARV. L. SCH. F. 
ON CORP. GOVERNANCE (Feb. 21, 2013, 9:10 AM), http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/corpgov/2013/02/21/ 
section-13r-disclosure-guidance-for-public-companies. 
 131  15 U.S.C. § 78m(r)(4). 
 132  Id. § 78m(r)(5). 
 133  Three industry associations—the National Association of Manufacturers, the Business Roundtable, and 
the U.S. Chamber of Commerce—challenged the SEC’s implementation of DFA § 1502.  On April 14, 2014, 
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit upheld the Conflict Minerals Final Rule with the 
exception of the requirement that issuers state in the Exchange Act filings and on their websites that their 
products are “DRC conflict free,” “not been found to be DRC conflict free,” or “DRC conflict 
undeterminable.”  See Nat’l Ass’n of Mfrs. v. SEC, 748 F.3d 359, 373 (D.C. Cir. 2014), overruled by Am. 
Meat Inst. v. USDA, 760 F.3d 18 (D.C. Cir. 2014).  Following this decision, the SEC affirmed that Exchange 
Act reporting companies were required to meet the initial June 2, 2014 deadline for all other DFA § 1502 
disclosure requirements.  See Keith F. Higgins, Statement on the Effect of the Recent Court of Appeals 
Decision on the Conflict Minerals Rule (Apr. 29, 2014), available at http://www.sec.gov/News/PublicStmt/ 
Detail/PublicStmt/1370541681994#.U9wfjyjBEgo. 
 134  See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 1504, 
124 Stat. 1376 (2010).  Section 1504 complements the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative 
(EITI), a voluntary stakeholder initiative that combats corruption by providing disclosure that enables 
comparison of what extractive companies pay governments with what governments say they receive. 
 135  In 2013, a U.S. federal court decision vacated SEC Rule 13q-1, which implemented § 1504’s 
disclosure requirements.  See Am. Petrol. Inst. v. Oxfam Am., Inc., 953 F. Supp. 2d 5 (D.D.C. 2013). 
 136  The North Korea Sanctions Enforcement Act of 2014, which was passed by the House of 
Representatives on July 28, 2014, seeks to strengthen financial sanctions against the government of 
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enacting, social transparency regimes under domestic securities law 
comparable to DFA § 1502.137 
DFA § 1502 and ITRA § 219 raise a number of issues regarding the 
scope and purposes of TST.  The following figure identifies the major 
differences between these two TST regimes: 
 
Figure 2. Comparison of DFA § 1502 and ITRA § 219 
 
DFA § 1502  ITRA § 219 
Human rights abuses 
associated with conflict 
minerals trade and civil 
conflict in the Congo 
Scope 
 
Human rights abuses by 
Iranian government; plus 
Iran’s energy sector, 
WMDs and other military 





End involvement of armed 





Expand and strengthen 
U.S. economic sanctions 
against Iran 
 
North Korea.  It targets firms, foreign governments, other entities, and individuals involved in human 
rights abuses committed by the North Korean government as well as the proliferation of weapons of 
mass destruction, money laundering and other illicit activities, sponsorship of international terrorism, 
censorship, and other sanctioned activities.  See North Korea Sanctions Enforcement Act of 2014, H.R. 
1771, 113th Cong. §§ 2, 101(a) (2014).  Similar to ITRA § 219, it imposes new disclosure requirements 
under the Exchange Act that would require an Exchange Act reporting company to disclose its 
involvement in any sanctioned activity in its annual or quarterly report filed with the SEC.  Id. § 302(a) 
(amending § 13 of the Exchange Act by adding a new subsection (s)). 
 137  See Sarfaty, supra note 7, at 108 (describing legislation in Canada and the EU).  In March 2014, the 
European Commission released a proposed framework for conflict minerals regulation.  See European 
Commission, Proposal For a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council Setting Up a Union 
System for Supply Chain Due Diligence Self-certification of Responsible Importers of Tin, Tantalum and 
Tungsten, Their Ores, and Gold Originating in Conflict-affected and High-risk Areas, 2014/0059 (COD) (Mar. 
5, 2014), available at http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2014/ march/tradoc_152227.pdf; see also Karel De 
Gucht, European Commission, Ensuring Minerals From Conflict Zones Are Sourced Responsibly, 
STATEMENT/14/50 (Mar. 5, 2014), available at http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_STATEMENT-
14-50_en.htm (announcing the European Commission’s proposed regulation). 
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Both TST regimes cover a broad range of activities and entities.  
Neither DFA § 1502 nor ITRA § 219 includes a materiality threshold for 
triggering mandatory reporting.138  MNEs are subject to potential liability 
under the Exchange Act for any false or misleading information.139  Neither 
regime establishes a bright-line rule that distinguishes domestic issuers 
from foreign private issuers—both domestic and foreign MNEs are subject 
to their respective disclosure requirements.140  Comparable to supply-chain 
reporting required by DFA § 1502, ITRA § 219 requires Exchange Act 
reporting companies to disclose activities of any affiliate, which may 
include transactions and dealings with foreign customers, clients, vendors, 
 
 138  See 15 U.S.C. § 78m(r)(2)(B) (providing that a company subject to ITRA § 219 shall disclose a 
detailed description of “the gross revenues and net profits, if any, attributable to the activity”) (emphasis 
added). 
 139  See Conflict Minerals Final Rule, 77 Fed. Reg. at 56,304 n.342 (Sept. 12, 2012) (codified at 17 
C.F.R. §§ 240, 249B) (noting that issuers are subject to potential liability under §§ 10(b), 13(a) and (p), 
15(d), and 18(a) of the Exchange Act as well as Rule 10b-5); see also text accompanying notes 57–59 
(summarizing disclosure-related Exchange Act liability).  Importantly, however, liability is still 
conditioned on the materiality requirements in these antifraud provisions.  For example, under Rule 10b-
5, a plaintiff may only sue an Exchange Act reporting company for misrepresentation or omission of a 
material fact in its DFA § 1502 disclosure documents.  See Conflict Minerals Final Rule, 77 Fed. Reg. at 
56,304 n.342. 
 140  See Conflict Minerals Final Rule, 77 Fed. Reg. at 56,287 (declining to exempt foreign private 
issuers from DFA § 1502); 15 U.S.C. § 78m(r)(1) (applying ITRA § 219 to all issuers). 
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and counterparties and the activities of corporate directors and senior 
executives.141  Consequently, ITRA § 219 compels MNEs to provide 
disclosures regarding the activities of non-U.S. affiliates that are organized 
under the laws of non-U.S. jurisdictions.  In many of these non-U.S. 
jurisdictions, it is legal to do business in Iran and to do business with the 
Iranian government.142 
Compliance with both TST regimes imposes significant costs on firms.  
Their respective disclosure requirements involve various functions within 
MNEs, including legal counsel, financial reporting, audit and accounting, 
supply-chain management and procurement, manufacturing quality control, 
and public relations.143  Related compliance costs—which may include 
supply-chain due diligence, third-party verification, external private audits, 
traceability schemes, and sourcing mechanisms—require external 
expenditures.144  Aside from these direct costs, it is plausible that the 
information disclosed by MNEs regarding their use of conflict minerals 
may impose a variety of indirect costs.145  Due to these costs, some 
observers have argued that TST regimes may simply divert MNEs to other 
regulatory jurisdictions and host countries that do not have comparable 
social transparency rules.146 
DFA § 1502 and ITRA § 219 differ in several significant ways.  Most 
importantly, DFA § 1502 is solely dedicated to advancing international 
human rights whereas the human rights goals of ITRA § 219 are 
 
 141  Under Rule 12b-2 of the Exchange Act, an “affiliate” of a company is a person who directly (or 
indirectly through one or more intermediaries) controls, is controlled by, or is under common control 
with such company.  The term “control” is defined as the power to direct or cause the direction of the 
management and policies of a person, whether through the ownership of voting securities, by contract, 
or otherwise.  See 17 C.F.R. § 240.12b-2. 
 142  See Ben DiPietro, Iran Sanctions Law Reporting Causing Confusion, WALL ST. J. CORRUPTION 
CURRENTS BLOG (Feb. 20, 2013, 1:49 PM), http://blogs.wsj.com/corruption-currents/2013/02/20/iran-
sanctions-law-reporting-causing-confusion. 
 143  See David M. Lynn, The Dodd-Frank Act’s Specialized Corporate Disclosure: Using the 
Securities Laws to Address Public Policy Issues, 6 J. BUS. &. TECH. L. 327, 335–36 (2011) (describing 
the range of DFA § 1502 compliance costs). 
 144  Woody, supra note 71, at 1332–33; see also Edward Wyatt, Use of ‘Conflict Minerals’ Gets 
More Scrutiny From U.S., N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 19, 2012, at B1 (noting compliance costs ranging from $71 
million estimated by the SEC to $9–$16 billion estimated by the National Association of 
Manufacturers). 
 145  See Marcia Narine, From Kansas to the Congo: Why Naming and Shaming Corporations 
Through the Dodd-Frank Act’s Corporate Governance Disclosure Won’t Solve a Human Rights Crisis, 
25 REGENT U. L. REV. 351, 392 (2013) (citing the cost to shareholders resulting from DFA § 1502’s 
effects on management and customer decision making); see also Ochoa & Keenan, supra note 43, at 
146–47 (noting concerns about potential litigation under the ATS, complaints before National Contact 
Point bodies, targeted UN sanctions, and consumer boycotts). 
 146  Sarfaty, supra note 7, at 112–13 (noting that mandatory disclosure may force companies to 
withdraw from the U.S. capital markets); Woody, supra note 71, at 1345–46 (arguing that DFA § 1502 
may lead to a de facto embargo of all minerals from the Congo damaging the Congolese economy in the 
process). 
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intermingled with other nonsocial policy objectives of the U.S. sanctions 
regime against Iran.147  Reflecting this divergence, ITRA § 219 imposes 
penalties on MNEs that comply with its disclosure requirements—i.e., the 
possibility of being subject to sanctions after investigation by the 
President).  Further, unlike the stand-alone DFA § 1502, ITRA § 219 is 
accompanied by other nonmandatory SEC programs to address corporate 
complicity with state sponsors of terrorism such as Iran.148 
 
IV.  CONSTRUCTIVE DISCOURSE AND CORPORATE    
STRATEGY 
 
A.  The Integrative and Expressive Dimensions of Constructive 
Discourse 
 
The broad mandate of TST and the limitations of mandatory disclosure 
pose particularly unique challenges.149  In comparison to mandatory 
disclosure of economic and financial information under U.S. federal 
securities law, TST broadens the de facto audience for disclosed 
information beyond investors to all stakeholders.  Moreover, in comparison 
to Regulation S-K and other generalized social transparency regimes, TST's 
disclosure requirements are more focused, exhaustive, and arguably 
contentious. 
In light of concerns about the effectiveness and costs of mandatory 
disclosure, this Article presents the concept of constructive discourse.  
Drawing from constructivist approaches to public international law, 
applications of reflexive law, and the experiences of voluntary CSR 
reporting schemes referenced in the following discussion, constructive 
discourse helps conceptualize the ways in which MNEs use the process of 
complying with disclosure and disclosed information to recognize and 
respond to TST's geographically defined or issue-specific public policy 
objectives.  The term “constructive discourse” reveals its dual conceptual 
foundations: (i) constructivism, originally formulated in political science 
and subsequently applied to legal rules and institutions, which focuses on 
the role of norms in shaping behavior; and (ii) discourse-based theories of 
international law and international relations theory, which emphasize the 
 
 147  ITRA § 219 also requires disclosure of transactions and dealings relating to Iran’s investment in 
the petroleum and petrochemical sectors, development of weapons of mass destruction, or sponsorship 
of international terrorism.  See 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m(r)(A), (B), and (D). 
 148  See Amy Deen Westbrook, What’s in Your Portfolio? U.S. Investors Are Unknowingly 
Financing State Sponsors of Terrorism, 59 DEPAUL L. REV. 1151, 1217–21 (2010) (describing the 
accomplishments and failures of the SEC’s Office of Global Security Risk). 
 149  See Davidoff & Hill, supra note 51, at 634–36 (lamenting securities disclosure as a flawed 
alternative to substantive regulatory reform and specifically citing DFA § 1502); see also Part I.B.2. 
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ways in which communication influences how legal obligations are 
interpreted, applied, and enforced.150 
What distinguishes constructive discourse from traditional conceptions 
of mandatory disclosure is that its value is not directly derived from 
external responses to disclosed information.  Whereas predominant 
rationales for mandatory disclosure focus on the use of information by 
stakeholders, constructive discourse emphasizes how MNEs can benefit 
from TST through firm-level, internally generated change.  Constructive 
discourse posits that mandatory disclosure works when it helps incentivize 
MNEs to facilitate communication with each other and stakeholders. 
Rather than constituting a legal doctrine or specific operational 
practices, constructive discourse may be viewed as a set of principles to 
show how firms can use social transparency for their own ends.  Facilitating 
firm level discourse augments the impact of stakeholder pressure on MNEs 
by channeling the potentially transformative effects of norms and ideas, 
which can lead to changes in the underlying interests of firms.151  
Therefore, the effectiveness of a given TST regime can be gauged by its 
ability to catalyze the corporate policymaking and self-regulation processes 
through which MNEs identify information concerning their social impacts, 
ascertain their significance and relevance, and reconcile them with other 
corporate objectives.  The insights of constructive discourse suggest that 
TST regimes should focus on establishing procedures to guide the decision 
making of MNEs and communication between them instead of crafting 
disclosure requirements with the arguably false hope of achieving 
predetermined policy outcomes.152 
Constructive discourse consists of two nonsequential, overlapping, and 
mutually reinforcing dimensions: an integrative dimension and an 
expressive dimension.  The following figure summarizes the basic 




 150  The author of this Article has previously explored applications of a related concept in other 
international legal contexts.  See Stephen Kim Park, Talking the Talk and Walking the Walk: Reviving 
Global Trade and Development After Doha, 53 VA. J. INT’L L. 365, 397–413 (2013) (examining how 
development-based human rights doctrine can serve as the basis for institutional communication in the 
global trade regime). 
 151  See Emilie M. Hafner-Burton, David G. Victor & Yonatan Lupu, Political Science Research on 
International Law: The State of the Field, 106 AM. J. INT’L L. 47, 54–56 (2012) (identifying as a source 
of power in international relations the ability to shape, through the spread of norms and ideas, what 
societies see as legitimate and acceptable). 
 152  See Hess, supra note 18, at 61 (quoting Gunther Teubner, After Legal Instrumentalism? Strategic 
Models of Post-Regulatory Law, in DILEMMAS OF LAW IN THE WELFARE STATE 299, 310–12 (Gunther 
Teubner ed., 1986)) (calling for a legal approach that enables a corporation and its stakeholders to more 
effectively communicate and influence each other rather than seeking “utopian and unrealistic” 
comprehensive social planning). 
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Figure 3. Integrative and Expressive Dimensions of Constructive Discourse 
Integrative  Expressive 
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1.  Integrative Dimension 
 
The integrative dimension of constructive discourse focuses on what 
corporate managers learn about the MNEs' social impacts through the 
disclosure process.  In order for MNEs to maximize the utility that they 
derive from complying with TST disclosure requirements, they must be 
able to recognize the extent to which the social values underlying the TST 
regime bear on their own self-conceptions.153  Constructive discourse 
facilitates the integration of the competing values underlying firm-level 
profit maximization and society-level noneconomic objectives.  These 
distinct values are frequently difficult to reconcile thereby leading to a 
cognitive-like dissonance among corporate managers.154  This dissonance 
between MNEs dual institutional selves—as profit maximizers on the one 
hand versus virtuous global citizens on the other—may lead to doubt and 
conflict about how to fulfill their social obligations.  A firm’s perception of 
its social obligations is determined by prevailing social expectations among 
stakeholders and other external parties of what constitutes appropriate 
business behavior.155 
 
 153  For example, the human rights aspirations of MNEs may range from a fear of negative publicity 
arising from gross violations of human rights to a deep-rooted normative commitment to human rights 
principles.  In any event, there are potential conflicts between any such social values and other corporate 
objectives. 
 154  See Martha Finnemore & Kathryn Sikkink, International Norm Dynamics and Political Change, 
52 INT’L. ORG. 887, 904 (1998) (noting how self-awareness of discrepancies between words and actions 
and a consequent desire to enhance self-esteem lead to changes to norm-violating behavior by state 
leaders). 
 155  Jackson, supra note 77, at 120.  The instrumental effect of social expectations is evident in the 
concept of a “social license,” which consists of the demands on and expectations for a business 
enterprise emerging from civil society.  The demands of social licensors constrain corporate conduct 
independent of compliance with law.  See Neil Gunningham, Robert A. Kagan & Dorothy Thornton, 
Social License and Environmental Protection: Why Businesses Go Beyond Compliance, 29 LAW & SOC. 
INQUIRY 307, 308 (2004); see also Sarfaty, supra note 7, at 124–25 (noting the importance of social 
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For example, many corporate codes of conduct include express 
commitments to social values such as human rights.156  Whether such codes 
are developed ad hoc for a specific firm (internal codes) or for multiple 
firms in a specific industry or generally (model or external codes), an MNE 
is expected to pledge itself publicly to a code’s principles, standards, or 
guidelines.157  Nonetheless, there are cognitive gaps between the MNEs’ 
legalistic commitment to social values set forth in codes of conduct and 
their understanding of what is required to actually fulfill them.158  The 
substance of disclosed information can help make tangible to MNEs the 
disjuncture between their rhetoric and their actions with respect to social 
values—i.e., when confronting themselves with information regarding their 
conduct, MNEs may realize that they are not who they claim to be.159  
Disclosed information regarding the adverse effects of MNEs on the 
protection of human rights, for example, can add social meaning to abstract 
legal mandates.160  In doing so, MNEs and their corporate managers 
identify and define for themselves the prescriptive value of a given TST 
regime.161  By linking specific situations to normatively meaningful social 
values, the act of disclosing may reduce ambiguity regarding the purpose of 
mandatory disclosure rules thereby enhancing the legitimacy of the TST 
regime itself.162 
 Beyond recognizing the relevance of norms, MNEs can use disclosure 
to facilitate creative and critical thinking about how to minimize the 
 
license to MNEs that operate in host countries with weak governments). 
 156  See Murphy, supra note 101, at 400. 
 157  See id. at 400–01.  Many corporate codes of conduct include provisions on information 
disclosure by MNEs.  Ratner, supra note 91, at 531. 
 158  See Murphy, supra note 101, at 421–22. 
 159  See Finnemore & Sikkink, supra note 154, at 903–04 (noting the role of conformity and self-
esteem in shaping compliance with norms); Park, supra note 150, at 402 (noting the effects of rights-
based norms on self-conceptions of state behavior). 
 160  See Woods, supra note 76, at 65 (noting the impact of advertisements on triggering implicit 
attitudes). 
 161  See Jutta Brunnée & Stephen J. Toope, International Law and Constructivism: Elements of an 
Interactional Theory of International Law, 39 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 19, 72 (2000) (arguing that 
law is persuasive when it calls upon legal reasoning to justify its processes and substantive goals); 
Finnemore & Sikkink, supra note 154, at 891 (identifying the quality of “oughtness” in norms that 
establish standards for socially appropriate or proper behavior). 
 162  See Thomas M. Franck, Legitimacy in the International System, 82 AM. J. INT’L L. 705, 706 
(1988) (defining legitimacy as the “quality of a rule which derives from a perception on the part of those 
to whom it is addressed that it has come into being in accordance with right process”); Christiana 
Ochoa, Corporate Social Responsibility and Firm Compliance: Lessons from the International Law - 
International Relations Discourse, 9 SANTA CLARA J. INT’L L. 169, 174 (2011) (applying Franck’s 
legitimacy framework to CSR regimes); see also Daniel T. Ostas, Cooperate, Comply, or Evade? A 
Corporate Executive's Social Responsibilities with Regard to Law, 41 AM. BUS. L.J. 559, 592 (2004) 
(observing that a businessperson must believe “that the purpose behind the law is sufficiently noble” in 
order to be willing to forego pecuniary self-interest). 
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adverse social impacts of their cross-border activities.163  The act of 
disclosing requires that the various divisions within MNEs coordinate with 
each other to create monitoring systems, implement industry best practices, 
modernize data collection, and strengthen internal controls and risk 
management functions.  TST regimes are “reflexion” mechanisms, which 
are defined as internal firm procedures that facilitate self-critical reflection 
by MNEs about how to identify, substantiate, and fulfill normative 
understandings.164  Disclosed information provides MNEs with strategically 
valuable knowledge about how they operate and the perceptions of their 
operations among stakeholders.165 
 
2.  Expressive Dimension 
 
The expressive dimension of constructive discourse focuses on 
disclosure as the basis for social, interactive communication by MNEs.  It 
focuses on processes through which MNEs use disclosure to communicate 
with each other and stakeholders regarding the implications of adverse 
social impacts.  Political theorists and sociologists have analyzed the causal 
significance of argumentation, persuasion, acculturation, and other forms of 
socialization in influencing state compliance with international law.166  
According to these approaches, states comply with international human 
rights because they come to agree with their normative content through 
moral discourse.167  Rhetorical commitments by states—initially driven by 
instrumental calculations based on reputation, power, and legitimacy—may 
eventually lead to the internalization of human rights norms.168  Likewise, 
the ideas, values, and beliefs of MNEs are shaped through social processes 
 
 163  See Gunther Teubner, Substantive and Reflexive Elements in Modern Law, 17 L. & SOC’Y REV. 
239 (1983) (articulating the theory of reflexive law); see also Hess, supra note 18, at 66–72 (applying 
reflexive law principles to CSR reporting); Eric W. Orts, Reflexive Environmental Law, 89 NW. U. L. 
REV. 1227, 1231–32 (1995) (identifying the application of reflexive law theory to environmental 
management). 
 164  See Hess, supra note 18, at 51; Orts, supra note 163, at 1253. 
 165  See Hess, supra note 18, at 81–82. 
 166  See Hafner-Burton, Victor & Lupu, supra note 151, at 57 (identifying persuasion and 
communication as a source of power in international relations). 
 167  See Thomas Risse & Kathryn Sikkink, The Socialization of International Human Rights Norms 
Into Domestic Practices: Introduction, in THE POWER OF HUMAN RIGHTS: INTERNATIONAL NORMS AND 
DOMESTIC CHANGE 1, 8–13 (Thomas Risse, Kathryn Sikkink & Stephen C. Ropp eds., 1999); Joel P. 
Trachtman, Who Cares About International Human Rights?: The Supply and Demand of International 
Human Rights Law, 44 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 851, 876 (2012). 
 168  See Suzanne Katzenstein, Reverse-Rhetorical Entrapment: Naming and Shaming as a Two-Way 
Street, 46 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L. L. 1079, 1084–85 (2013) (describing the “rhetorical entrapment” of 
governments through naming and shaming by human rights groups).  But see Oona A. Hathaway, Do 
Human Rights Treaties Make a Difference?, 111 YALE L.J. 1935, 2006–07 (2002) (noting that, in 
absence of effective monitoring and enforcement mechanisms, a country may express its commitment to 
a human rights treaty while failing to meet its substantive requirements). 
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that generate shared understandings and mutual expectations.169 
While theories of state-centric behavior should not be carelessly 
applied to MNEs, both share certain important characteristics.170  Like 
states, processes of socialization between MNEs and other stakeholders 
influence how they act and on what grounds they justify their actions.171  As 
with states and political leaders, the salience of social values to MNEs is 
premised on the ability of corporate managers to persuade others and a 
willingness on the part of corporate managers to be persuaded.172 
The expressive dimension of constructive discourse reframes 
disclosure as an inherently social process both within and between 
MNEs.173  Through the information gathering and due diligence activities 
that they require firms to conduct, TST regimes help shape what kinds of 
corporate conduct are seen as valid by defining the scope of socially 
legitimate behavior.  Through its compliance with disclosure rules, an MNE 
makes a public commitment to the broader social values on which the TST 
regime is based.174  By this measure, the more robust the disclosure 
requirement, the stronger the MNE’s commitment to fulfill its goals.175 
Further, references to social values, such as international human rights, 
in TST-mandated disclosure documents may influence the language used in 
 
 169  See Ochoa, supra note 162, at 171–75 (applying state-based international relations theory to the 
problem of MNE compliance with global CSR norms). 
 170  See id. at 176 (cautioning that processes of socialization among MNEs require more formality 
and institutionalization in comparison to states); Andreas Georg Scherer, Guido Palazzo & Dorothée 
Baumann, Global Rules and Private Actors: Toward a New Role of the Transnational Corporation in 
Global Governance, 16 BUS. ETHICS Q. 505, 522 (2006) (noting the “striking parallel” between 
corporate and governmental reactions to accusations of human rights violations). 
 171  Just as individuals are neither pure manifestations of self-interested homo economicus or 
cooperative homo reciprocans, both states and MNEs must also grapple with competing allegiances.  
Although governments and corporate management should not be casually attributed with human 
characteristics, their respective decision-making processes are driven by individuals and groups of 
individuals. 
 172  See Thomas Risse, “Let’s Argue!”: Communicative Action in World Politics, 54 INT’L ORG. 1, 
14–16 (2000) (describing the conditions in which argumentative persuasion in international negotiations 
is feasible); see also Steven R. Ratner, Persuading to Comply: On the Deployment and Avoidance of 
Legal Argumentation, in INTERDISCIPLINARY PERSPECTIVES ON INTERNATIONAL LAW AND 
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS: THE STATE OF THE ART 572 (Jeffrey L. Dunoff & Mark A. Pollack eds., 
2012). 
 173  See Davidoff & Hill, supra note 51, at 632 (stating that “disclosure is importantly social”); see 
also Gerald F. Davis, New Directions in Corporate Governance, 31 ANN. REV. SOC. 143, 158 (2005) 
(observing that a firm’s credibility concerning its accountability and transparency “is a matter of 
rhetoric”). 
 174  See Hathaway, supra note 168, at 2005 (noting the expressive function of treaties arising from 
what a country’s membership in a treaty regime signals to other domestic or international actors); 
Woods, supra note 76, at 82–83 (suggesting that state compliance with a human rights norm is enhanced 
by the act of publicly declaring its commitment to the norm). 
 175  See Woods, supra note 76, at 83–84 (arguing that human rights action plans can serve as 
commitment devices). 
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discourse among MNEs and between MNEs and their respective 
stakeholders.176  This may be viewed positively or negatively.  Spurred by 
external public pressure from NGOs, SRIs, and similar stakeholder groups 
that have access to disclosed information, the processes of socialization 
may lead to more frequent references to noneconomic values by corporate 
managers.177  However, while the adaption of social rights language in 
securities disclosure may elevate the agendas of NGOs and other 
stakeholders, it also runs the risk of compromising future action to address 
adverse social impacts.178  These language compromises may diminish the 
rhetorical power of disclosure by cloaking adverse social impacts in legal 
and technical jargon.179  The potentially negative effects of assimilation 
suggest that regulatory oversight and bright-line rules limiting the 
autonomy of MNEs to determine how to comply with disclosure 
requirements are warranted.180  Arguably, the transplantation of TST 
regimes into the relatively robust, far reaching enforcement mechanisms of 
U.S. federal securities law helps serve this purpose.181 
In addition, disclosure is useful as a means to enable institutional 
learning by MNEs.  MNEs can use the substance of disclosed information 
to generate a shared vocabulary with other MNEs and stakeholders on how 
social objectives should be balanced with other corporate objectives.  
Further, by facilitating the internalization of social norms within MNEs, the 
very act of using disclosed information to communicate externally 
facilitates evolutionary, iterative standard setting by MNEs.182  
 
 176  See Jena Martin, Business and Human Rights: What's the Board Got to Do With It?, 2013 U. ILL. 
L. REV. 959, 992 (2013) (stating that articulating human rights as business risk may make it easier for 
firms to understand); Christiana Ochoa, Advancing the Language of Human Rights in a Global 
Economic Order: An Analysis of a Discourse, 23 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 57, 106 (2003) (identifying 
the evolution of a shared “pidgin” language between international human rights and economic actors). 
 177  See Risse & Sikkink, supra note 167, at 25; Thomas Risse, Governance under Limited 
Sovereignty, in BACK TO BASICS: STATE POWER IN A CONTEMPORARY WORLD 93 (Martha Finnemore 
& Judith Goldstein eds., 2013).  The special role of in-house counsel as corporate managers with unique 
fiduciary duties and disclosure responsibilities is described later in this Article.  See infra Part IV.B.2. 
 178  See Ochoa, supra note 176, at 110–12; see also Katzenstein, supra note 168, at 1081–82 (arguing 
that governments are capable of shifting human rights discourse with NGOs in a manner to justify and 
reaffirm their own consequentialist justifications). 
 179  See Davidoff & Hill, supra note 51, at 633 (arguing that lawyers have a “community of interest” 
in using disclosure “language that is technically accurate but manages to sound remote”); Ochoa, supra 
note 176, at 112 (arguing that language compromises between the human rights and international 
economic communities may preclude future action by formulating rights as economically based). 
 180  See Ford, supra note 97, at 48 (proposing that deliberation and argumentation regarding 
regulatory compliance be subject to certain non-negotiable rules); Jackson, supra note 77, at 148 
(advocating external verification of MNEs’ human rights reporting). 
 181  See Hess, supra note 18, at 72 (proposing regulatory oversight coupled with private enforcement 
of mandatory social reporting standards); see also Hathaway, supra note 168, at 2014 (suggesting that 
compliance with human rights treaties—and hence the substantive value of their expressive function—is 
bolstered by monitoring and enforcement mechanisms). 
 182  See Ford, supra note 97, at 36 (describing one of the advantages of principles-based regulation).  
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Communication between MNEs and regulators, as well as information 
sharing among MNEs, facilitates the use of best practices and other forms 
of self-learning by firms.183  By drawing from an array of particularized 
examples of ways in which they address the social impacts of their conduct, 
MNEs can use TST disclosed information to more effectively engage in 
dialogue with civil society, regulators, shareholders, and other MNEs about 
what is socially appropriate and necessary.184 
While these actions are a potential source of value to MNEs on their 
own terms, they also serve the purpose of signaling to other MNEs their 
willingness to reconcile business and social values by following certain 
standardized, socially legitimated models of corporate behavior.185  
Acculturation shapes behavior by generating social pressure to conform 
with the expectations of a self-identified reference group.186  In this vein, 
the proliferation of voluntary CSR certification schemes suggests that 
MNEs may seek to expressly acknowledge their conformity to global social 
values by “joining the club.”187 
 
B.  Constructive Discourse and Corporate Strategy 
 
One of the overarching purposes of constructive discourse is to 
harmonize the traditional regulatory foundations of TST and its New 
Governance aspects.  The efficacy of TST depends, at least in part, on the 
MNEs’ perception that they stand to individually gain from the visibility of 
their efforts to properly and thoroughly disclose information regarding their 
adverse social impacts.188  Identifying positive synergies between disclosure 
requirements and firm-level utility will increase the likelihood that firms 
will improve the process, which will enhance both the sustainability and 
 
In this respect, the rules-based orientation of U.S. federal securities law arguably hinders the dynamic 
and insightful lawmaking carried out by firms in principles-based securities regulation regimes, such as 
the United Kingdom. 
 183  Best practices involve regulated entities “devis[ing] practices to comply with relatively 
unspecific regulatory requirements,” which are then selected and publicized as “best” by public 
regulators with the idea that these best practices will “be subsequently adopted by other regulated 
entities.”  See David Zaring, Best Practices, 81 N.Y.U. L. REV. 294, 308 (2006). 
 184  See Hess, supra note 18, at 82–83. 
 185  See Ryan Goodman & Derek Jinks, How to Influence States: Socialization and International 
Human Rights Law, 54 DUKE L.J. 621, 667–68 (2004). 
 186  See id. at 638; see also Trachtman, supra note 167, at 876–77; Woods, supra note 76, at 72. 
 187  See Matthew Potoski & Aseem Prakash, Green Clubs and Voluntary Governance: ISO 14001 
and Firms’ Regulatory Compliance, 49 AM. J. POL. SCI. 235 (2005) (describing how corporate 
adherence to ISO 14001 environmental standards is driven by the appeal of the club's positive brand 
reputation). 
 188  See FUNG, GRAHAM & WEIL, supra note 4, at 112 (observing that changing disclosers’ 
perceptions of self-interest helps improve transparency systems and ensure their survival). 
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effectiveness of TST regimes.189  The following discussion explores several 
ways that MNEs can strategically use constructive discourse.  These 
strategic considerations fall into two broad categories: managing risk and 
enhancing competitive advantage.  Both considerations rest on the 
instrumental value of social transparency—that is, as a means of increasing 
profits, enhancing shareholder value, and improving the financial interests 
of the firm.190 
 
1.  As Risk Management 
 
Constructive discourse as risk management is based on the use of TST 
disclosure to prevent, identify, monitor, and mitigate adverse business 
outcomes.191  These potential outcomes may be characterized as “risk”— 
contingent events that may potentially lead to future harm to the firm.192  
Risk management involves organizational processes through which a firm 
seeks to optimize the types and levels of risk with its strategic goals.193 
The relationship between TST and risk management is manifested in 
two ways.  First, MNEs must be cognizant of operational risk, which is 
defined as the “risk of loss resulting from inadequate or failed internal 
processes, people and systems or from external events.”194  Among the 
components of operational risk is compliance risk—i.e., risk of legal or 
regulatory sanctions, material financial loss, or loss to reputation as a result 
of a failure to comply with laws, regulations, rules, related self-regulatory 
organization standards, and codes of conduct.195  MNEs may face several 
different forms of operational risk arising from their cross-border activities.  
First and foremost, MNEs must ensure their compliance with TST 
mandatory disclosure rules.  Further, adverse social impacts, such as 
corporate complicity with international human rights, often present legal 
 
 189  Hess, supra note 49, at 468; see also Ford, supra note 97, at 49 (asserting that a firm is more 
likely to comply when it is able to identify a link between its long-term business success and strong 
internal compliance processes). 
 190  See Jackson, supra note 77, at 121. 
 191  See Carroll & Shabana, supra note 13, at 97 (summarizing justifications for CSR practices based 
on reducing costs and risks to the firm). 
 192  See Michelle M. Harner, Barriers to Effective Risk Management, 40 SETON HALL L. REV. 1323, 
1328–29 (2010); Robert F. Weber, An Alternative Story of the Law and Regulation of Risk Management, 
15 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 1005, 1010 (2013).  
 193  Stephen M. Bainbridge, Caremark and Enterprise Risk Management, 34 J. CORP. L. 967, 969 
(2009). 
 194  BANK FOR INT’L SETTLEMENTS, BASEL COMM. ON BANKING SUPERVISION, PRINCIPLES FOR THE 
SOUND MANAGEMENT OF OPERATIONAL RISK 3 n.5 (2011), available at http://www.bis.org/ 
publ/bcbs195.pdf. 
 195  See BANK FOR INT’L SETTLEMENTS, BASEL COMM. ON BANKING SUPERVISION, COMPLIANCE 
AND THE COMPLIANCE FUNCTION IN BANKS 7 (2005), available at http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs113.pdf 
(defining compliance risk). 
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risks.196  MNEs can address these risks by conducting ongoing due 
diligence of their activities, operations, and relationships.  A prominent 
application is human rights due diligence, which involves the identification 
and investigation of relevant facts and then evaluation of those facts in light 
of a prevailing standard of care.197  As an integral component of a 
corporation’s enterprise risk management program, human rights due 
diligence overlaps with the common law duty of oversight, which requires 
that corporate boards attempt to ensure that an adequate internal 
information and reporting system is in place.198 
Second, in the context of their adverse social impacts, MNEs must be 
concerned with risks to their reputation arising from negative publicity for 
failure to comply with social norms.199  Reputation risks can be extremely 
costly albeit difficult to calculate as intangible assets.200  MNEs are 
increasingly aware of risks to their global brands due to adverse human 
rights, environmental, and labor impacts in their global supply chains.201  
By formalizing social norms in the language of law, TST may augment 
reputational sanctions by making violation of norms more unambiguous.202 
From a social welfare perspective, however, one objection to the use 
of TST as a risk management tool is that it suggests that adverse social 
impacts can be rationalized and contextualized.203  According to these 
observers, risk management cannot be solely justified on instrumental 
 
 196  See Virginia Harper Ho, Of Enterprise Principles and Corporate Groups: Does Corporate Law 
Reach Human Rights?, 52 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 113, 160 (2013) (referring to violations of local 
civil and criminal laws and domestic regulations in host country stemming from human rights abuses). 
 197  Mark B. Taylor, Luc Zandvliet & Mitra Forouhar, Due Diligence for Human Rights: A Risk-
Based Approach 3–4 (John F. Kennedy Sch. of Gov’t, Harv. Univ., Corporate Social Responsibility 
Initiative, Working Paper No. 53, Oct. 2009); see also Sabine Michalowski, No Complicity Liability for 
Funding Gross Human Rights Violations?, 30 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 451, 519 (2012) (describing the 
implementation of human rights risk management in accordance with the Guiding Principles). 
 198  In re Caremark Int’l Inc. Deriv. Lit., 698 A.2d 959, 970 (Del. Ch. 1996) (establishing the 
standard of conduct for director oversight); see Ho, supra note 196, at 157–58 (describing the Caremark 
duty in the context of human rights due diligence); see also Harner, supra note 192, at 1332 (describing 
enterprise risk management (or ERM) as a “holistic approach to risk management that considers 
strategic and operational risks in addition to financial risks”). 
 199  See O’Callaghan, supra note 12, at 109 (identifying the environment, labor exploitation, 
indifference to the health and safety of workers, complicity in human rights abuses, and corruption and 
bribery as elements of reputation risk). 
 200  See id. at 108–09. 
 201  See Margaret M. Blair, Cynthia A. Williams & Li-Wen Lin, The New Role for Assurance 
Services in Global Commerce, 33 J. CORP. L.325, 338–42 (2008) (describing the development of 
assurance services to certify that suppliers meet social standards in order to protect MNEs’ “brand 
value”). 
 202  See Park, supra note 150, at 404, 406 (noting how rights-based discourse can enhance 
reputational sanctions). 
 203  See Jackson, supra note 77, at 130–31 (arguing against the idea that the human rights 
responsibilities of business are defined by and justified with reference to social expectations). 
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grounds.204  The convergence of “human rights” and “risk management” 
reflects the fact that the concept of risk management itself is defined by 
rhetorical and political practices that define what sorts of contingent events 
constitute a “risk” in the first place.205  For example, the concept of human 
rights due diligence requires that firms evaluate risk from the perspective of 
potential victims not just risks faced by firms.206 
TST regimes further reflect, highlight, and shape prevailing standards 
of corporate behavior.207  The due diligence, monitoring, auditing, and 
supply chain management requirements in DFA § 1502 codify and 
incorporate principles of human rights due diligence.208  By requiring firms 
to conduct due diligence, DFA § 1502 and ITRA § 219 force firms to 
integrate human rights impact assessments into their existing risk 
management systems.209 
 
2.  For Competitive Advantage 
 
The use of TST for competitive advantage rests on the ability of MNEs 
to use social transparency to differentiate themselves from their 
competitors.210  The social complexity of an MNE’s relationships with its 
various stakeholders—defined by a web of overlapping, confusing, and 
sometimes conflicting legal obligations and social phenomena—can 
provide various opportunities for social transparency to be a source of 
sustainable competitive advantage.211  TST enables firms to maximize and 
preserve their “reputation capital,” which provides them with the credibility 
to profitably engage with regulators, NGOs, communities, and other 
 
 204  See Florian Wettstein, CSR and the Debate on Business and Human Rights: Bridging the Great 
Divide, 22 BUS. ETHICS Q. 739, 759 (2012) (arguing that corporations should have an affirmative 
obligation to help realize human rights, not merely respect them). 
 205  See Weber, supra note 192, at 1063. 
 206  See U.N. Human Rights Office of the High Comm’r, Guiding Principles on Business and Human 
Rights,  ¶ 17 (2011), available at http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Publications/GuidingPrinciples 
BusinessHR_EN.pdf (providing that ERM must include risks to rights holders). 
 207  See Gunningham, Kagan & Thornton, supra note 155, at 330 (noting how NGOs and other 
external stakeholders use compliance with regulation to judge compliance with social obligations). 
 208  See Narine, supra note 145, at 371; Sarfaty, supra note 7, at 106 (referring to DFA § 1502). 
 209  See Richardson, supra note 61, at 257 (arguing that translating environmental and ethical 
concerns as business risk through mandatory disclosure requirements helps facilitate corporate 
awareness of adverse social impacts). 
 210  See Robert C. Bird, Law, Strategy, and Competitive Advantage, 44 CONN. L. REV. 61, 72 (2011) 
(identifying value, rareness, imperfect imitability, and the lack of an equal substitute as components of 
competitive advantage); Carroll & Shabana, supra note 13, at 97–99 (summarizing justifications for 
CSR practices based on gaining competitive advantage). 
 211  See Bird, supra note 210, at 76 (defining social complexity as situations “when the source of a 
competitive advantage is known, but the method of replicating the advantage is difficult to identify due 
to social phenomena”). 
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stakeholders.212  While corporate efforts to strategically conform with social 
norms may lead to broader social benefits, that is not a precondition to its 
use by MNEs.213 
For MNEs in industries where adverse social impacts are relatively 
common, the very act of complying with TST regimes may serve as an 
advantageous market signal.214  While the “first mover” advantage accorded 
to firms may be diminished when disclosure is mandatory rather than 
voluntary, firms can augment the benefits of signaling by finding new 
means to communicate their culture of compliance to customers, investors, 
regulators, and other external parties.215  An MNE can use disclosure to 
inform its stakeholders of its efforts to achieve the TST regime’s policy 
goals by highlighting how it identifies, justifies, mitigates, and ultimately 
seeks to avoid adverse social impacts.  A record of socially responsible 
disclosure practices may build trust with various stakeholders, thereby 
leading to potentially favorable legal treatment for MNEs.216  Investors may 
value a corporation’s willingness to disclose information regarding its 
social impacts resulting in shareholder support of management and 
increased interest from prospective investors.217  Socially conscientious 
employees may value both the principle of transparency and greater 
knowledge about where they work.218  Regulators may grant greater 
autonomy to socially transparent MNEs in implementing internal reporting 
and due diligence regimes.219  SRIs may be more willing to add socially 
transparent MNEs to their selective lists of permitted investments or give 
such MNEs higher ratings.220  NGOs may choose to cooperate with MNEs 
 
 212  See Gunningham, Kagan & Thornton, supra note 155, at 319, 320 (listing the use of reputation 
capital to obtain access to lawmakers, the trust of regulators, the tolerance of local communities, and the 
least risk of being targeted by NGOs). 
 213  See Davis, supra note 173, at 153 (describing studies on strategic conformity by companies that 
do not lead to changes in the company’s behavior). 
 214  See FUNG, GRAHAM & WEIL, supra note 4, at 119–20 (noting that firms may gain “first mover” 
advantages from providing more information than competitors and then raising the bar of mandated 
disclosure); Babcock, supra note 77, at 36 (noting how companies that engage in voluntary 
environmental disclosure can curry favor from investors as early adopters). 
 215  See James Rathz, Compliance as the Competitive Differentiator, 12 DUQ. BUS. L.J. 13, 23–24 
(2009) (describing how financial professionals can use communication channels such as RFP responses, 
pitch books or prospect presentations, website profiles, newsletters, brochures, client reports, customer-
service oriented communications, and proposed narrative-based SEC disclosure). 
 216  See Carroll & Shabana, supra note 13, at 99 (noting that corporations can enhance their 
legitimacy and reputation though social and environmental disclosure). 
 217  See Williams, supra note 2, at 1284–87 (describing the benefits of disclosure beyond compliance 
with existing legal requirements to corporations). 
 218  See Babcock, supra note 77, at 37; Ribstein, supra note 14, at 1451–52; Faith Stevelman, Global 
Finance, Multinationals and Human Rights: With Commentary on Backer’s Critique of the 2008 Report 
by John Ruggie, 9 SANTA CLARA J. INT’L L. 101, 139 (2011). 
 219  See Bird, supra note 210, at 76; Gunningham, Kagan & Thornton, supra note 155, at 331. 
 220  Babcock, supra note 77, at 36. 
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instead of opposing them.221 
The impact of reputation may be diminished by stakeholders’ inability 
to compare MNEs across different industries, jurisdictions, organizational 
forms, and business cultures.222  Arguably, the more detailed, vivid, and 
focused the disclosed information is, the more effective it will be in 
persuading investors and other stakeholders to respond to it.223  Due to its 
specific focus and detailed procedural requirements, TST may help harness 
the power of reputation.224  On a related note, legal scholars define 
relational contracts as the penumbra of planning, trust, and solidarity norms 
that exceed the terms of the legal agreement between parties.225  TST 
regimes may be viewed as a means to nurture relational contracts among 
MNEs in the same industry or between MNEs and their institutional 
investors.  The sharing of information—along with the attendant practices 
and rituals associated with such information sharing—constitute the basis 
for a particular kind of relationally based legal arrangement made possible 
by the act of disclosure.226 
 
V.  APPLYING CONSTRUCTIVE DISCOURSE TO TARGETED 
 SOCIAL TRANSPARENCY 
 
A.  Analyzing the Current State of TST 
 
TST regimes under U.S. federal securities law are an evolutionary step 
in social transparency.  By implementing narrowly focused disclosure 
requirements for specific policy objectives, TST uses traditional regulatory 
techniques to address social objectives in a new way.227  In comparison to 
voluntary CSR reporting schemes (such as the GRI) and other forms of 
social transparency (such as Regulation S-K), TST strips from firms a 
substantial amount of discretionary authority to decide what, when, and 
 
 221  Gunningham, Kagan & Thornton, supra note 155, at 326–27 (describing companies that engage 
with environmental NGOs and community groups). 
 222  See Williams, supra note 2, at 1292–93 (noting how the relative lack of consistent, standardized 
social performance data reporting hinders meaningful intercompany comparisons and analyses). 
 223  See Woods, supra note 76, at 77 (noting that reputational sanctions, such as shaming, works best 
where there is clear rights violation, a clear violator, and a clear remedy). 
 224  See Patrick J. Keenan, Financial Globalization and Human Rights, 46 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 
509, 557–60 (2008) (arguing that formal, specific ratings linked to regulations can shape firm behavior 
by assigning a value to reputation). 
 225  Bird, supra note 210, at 77. 
 226  See Goshen & Parchomovsky, supra note 25, at 760 (noting that increased disclosure bolsters 
relational investing—i.e., increased holdings for longer durations by large investors). 
 227  See Orly Lobel, The Renew Deal: The Fall of Regulation and the Rise of Governance in 
Contemporary Legal Thought, 89 MINN. L. REV. 342, 405–06 tbl. 2 (2004) (comparing traditional 
regulatory approaches to “New Governance” models based on reflexive law, soft law, democratic 
experimentalism, and similar principles). 
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how to disclose information.  Current TST regimes under U.S. federal 
securities law both facilitate and hinder corporate strategic action in 
different ways. 
The procedural components of DFA § 1502 have the potential to 
facilitate the integrative function of constructive discourse.  If firms are able 
to use information collected through country of origin inquiries, internal 
due diligence, and external audits to understand their impact in the Congo, 
they will be able to more effectively manage commercial relationships with 
supply chain intermediaries and third-party contract manufacturers in a way 
that curbs the illicit trade of conflict minerals.  Similarly, the various 
reporting requirements of ITRA § 219 may facilitate corporate awareness of 
the ways in which their responsibility to respect human rights in Iran relates 
to the other nonhuman rights objectives of the U.S. sanctions program. 
The expressive function of constructive discourse, however, is 
hampered by current TST regimes.  Based on a hierarchical, rules-based 
approach to disclosure, both DFA § 1502 and ITRA § 219 may stifle 
meaningful dialogue between MNEs and stakeholders.  Both impose the 
obligation to disclose on Exchange Act reporting companies that are 
frequently not best situated to obtain the information.228  MNEs are often 
required to extract information from persons and entities with which they 
have extremely attenuated operational and legal relationships.  In the case 
of DFA § 1502, these entities are suppliers along their conflict minerals 
supply chains, while for ITRA § 219, the entities may be foreign-domiciled 
and non-U.S. law governed affiliates with which they transact.  The use of 
penalties for noncompliance with Exchange Act disclosure requirements 
may inhibit the ultimate objectives of TST by jeopardizing industry-
generated, collaborative initiatives between MNEs, local companies, supply 
chain intermediaries, governments, civil society, and multilateral 
institutions.229 
How might TST regimes be modified to enhance constructive 
discourse?  A constructive discourse approach to social transparency seeks 
to reorient TST in the following ways: First, from external pressure to  
internal assessment based on enlightened self-interest. Instead of acting 
only in response to external pressure, such as the threat of civil liability, 
MNEs should be able to use information from disclosure to engage in a 
continual process of self-assessment that takes into account the range of 
risks and strategic opportunities that they face in their commercial 
relationships. 
Second, from retrospective to prospective.  Instead of merely telling 
what happened through discrete acts of disclosure, MNEs should seek to 
 
 228  See Ochoa & Keenan, supra note 43, at 140. 
 229  See Seay, supra note 110 (arguing that DFA § 1502 has stifled multistakeholder dialogue and 
initiatives in the Congo). 
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draw from prior experiences to improve internal controls and contractual 
relationships.   
Third, from static to social.  Instead of viewing disclosure as a series 
of discrete, onetime events, MNEs should engage in a broad array of 
interactions with each other and their respective stakeholders in the context 
of their social impacts. 
Fourth, from a bright-line distinction between disclosure and 
regulation to a nuanced, case-by-case determination of the social utility of 
disclosure.  Instead of viewing mandatory disclosure as a blanket 
alternative to direct government regulation, regulators should have the 
discretion to permit the alternate use of voluntary reporting mechanisms 
created by MNEs on a case-by-case basis. 
 
B.  Proposals for Improving TST 
 
The concept of constructive discourse provides a template for 
improving current approaches to TST.  TST can be modified in various 
ways to facilitate its use by MNEs for their strategic benefit while 
concurrently furthering the social objectives of TST.  The following 
discussion proposes several different kinds of reforms and explores their 
potential implications. 
 
1.  Leveraging Voluntary CSR Reporting 
 
A key challenge for regulators, stakeholders, and other interested 
external parties is to inform and convince MNEs of the potential gains from 
TST compliance.  Voluntary CSR associations, established by MNEs in 
conjunction with NGOs, may play an important role in this learning process 
through the creation of targeted reporting and complaint mechanisms.230  
Alternatively, MNEs can take a positively reinforcing, proactive role 
through the use of privately trained and authorized audit and certification 
services that ensure compliance with social responsibility standards.231  
Third party assurance services help MNEs signal their commitment to 
social concerns to NGOs and SRIs.232  Notwithstanding the fact that third-
 
 230  See Park, supra note 150, at 412; see also Ribstein, supra note 14, at 1458–59 (identifying NGOs 
as partners in gathering and disclosing information about social harms, developing standards for socially 
responsible conduct, organizing boycotts, and lobbying for political action). 
 231  See Blair, Williams & Lin, supra note 201, at 333–34.  For example, MNEs have established 
conflict minerals disclosure programs in anticipation of the implementation of DFA § 1502.  See 
Quentin Hardy, Combating Tech’s Conflict Minerals With Disclosure, N.Y. TIMES BITS BLOG (Apr. 15, 
2013), http://bits.blogs.nytimes.com/2013/04/15/combating-techs-conflict-minerals-with-disclosure 
(describing Hewlett-Packard’s smelter documentation initiative, which requires that HP’s supply chain 
suppliers abstain from purchasing conflict minerals from a list of 195 ore smelters). 
 232  See Blair, Williams & Lin, supra note 201, at 342–46.  Specifically in the area of business and 
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party assurance services were initially developed in the context of voluntary 
CSR reporting, MNEs can benefit from multistakeholder oversight in 
respect of the same objectives addressed through a specific TST regime. 
Public–private governance schemes based on multistakeholder 
dialogue between governments, firms and industry associations, and NGOs 
seek to bridge the gap between traditional governmental regulation and 
New Governance.233  Perhaps most notably, the Kimberley Process 
Certification Scheme addresses the link between the diamond trade, child 
labor, and civil conflict in Africa.234  Established in accordance with the 
mandate of the United Nations, the Kimberley Process is a nonbinding 
governance regime that restricts the trade of conflict diamonds through a 
government-run certification scheme.235  Although the certification scheme 
is solely managed by its forty-nine member states, the Kimberley Process 
also includes NGOs and industry groups as observers, and collaborates with 
other multistakeholder initiatives such as the EITI.236  The Clean Diamond 
Trade Act implements the Kimberley Process under U.S. law by banning 
the importation of non-Kimberley Process certified diamonds and 
establishing domestic certification and enforcement processes.237 
The parallels between DFA § 1502 and the Kimberley Process have 
been addressed by numerous commentators.238  Notwithstanding the 
success of the Kimberley Process, the viability of multistakeholder 
approaches as a universal means to address the shortcomings of TST is 
 
human rights, the Mazars & Shift Project establishes a twin set of standards for human rights reporting 
and assurance based on the Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights: Implementing the 
United Nations “Protect, Respect and Remedy” Framework (the Guiding Principles), a voluntary, 
multistakeholder framework spearheaded by the Special Representative of the United Nations Secretary-
General John Ruggie.  The reporting standard requires a participating company to articulate and make 
public its fidelity with the Guiding Principles while developing internal metrics to track its progress 
toward full alignment.  The assurance standard provides an external, third-party audit of the company’s 
implementation of the Guiding Principles based on methodology developed by individual human rights 
assurance providers.  See MAZARS & SHIFT, THE BUSINESS AND HUMAN RIGHTS REPORTING AND 
ASSURANCE FRAMEWORKS INITIATIVE (“RAFI”) (Nov. 2013), available at http://business-
humanrights.org/media/documents/rafi-framing-document-2013.pdf. 
 233  See Stevelman, supra note 218, at 111 (noting the emergence of a multitude of multistakeholder 
initiatives in the area of business and human rights). 
 234  Conflict diamonds (also commonly referred to as blood diamonds) are defined as “rough 
diamonds used by rebel movements or their allies to finance conflict aimed at undermining legitimate 
governments.”  KIMBERLEY PROCESS CERTIFICATION SCHEME CORE DOCUMENT 3, available at 
http://www.kimberleyprocess.com/en/kpcs-core-document. 
 235  See Diane A. Desierto, Leveraging International Economic Tools To Confront Child Soldiering, 
43 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 337, 365–66 (2011). 
 236  See Julie Elizabeth Nichols, A Conflict of Diamonds: The Kimberley Process and Zimbabwe’s 
Marange Diamond Fields, 40 DEN. J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 648, 661–63 (2012). 
 237  19 U.S.C. § 3903(a) (2006). 
 238  See Narine, supra note 145, at 395–96; Taylor, supra note 115, at 115–16; Woody, supra note 
71, at 1347–51; Shannon Raj, Blood Electronics: Congo’s Conflict Minerals and the Legislation That 
Could Cleanse the Trade, 84 S. CAL. L. REV. 981, 994–1000 (2011). 
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uncertain.  The express foreign policy objectives underlying TST regimes 
render global regulatory uniformity unlikely thereby hindering the informal 
governmental coordination that characterizes the Kimberley Process.239  
This is particularly evident with respect to ITRA § 219.  Its disclosure 
requirements concern the activities of a broad array of business actors that 
do business in Iran across a range of economic sectors.240  Further, it is 
arguably unclear how MNEs view the urgency of human rights abuses in 
Iran compared to the conflict minerals trade in the Congo.241  These factors 
render it unlikely that organic multistakeholder initiatives involving MNEs, 
local and regional companies, civil society groups, governments, and 
multilateral institutions will develop absent regulatory incentives. 
To overcome these complicating factors, regulatory reforms should 
focus on leveraging existing voluntary CSR reporting in ways that enhance 
constructive discourse.  MNEs can benefit from intersectoral collection and 
sharing of information between MNEs regarding their respective supply 
chains and affiliate relationships.  To facilitate the use of best practices, 
centralized data repositories would help Exchange Act reporting companies 
share information regarding their respective due diligence and certification 
processes.  These repositories could be comanaged by the SEC and private 
entities, provide information across multiple TST regimes, and be publicly 
accessible to stakeholders.242  By integrating these information-sharing 
 
 239  The OECD has established a voluntary framework to guide firms in conducting due diligence in 
connection with supply chain management of conflict minerals.  See ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & 
DEV., OECD DUE DILIGENCE GUIDANCE FOR RESPONSIBLE SUPPLY CHAINS OF MINERALS FROM 
CONFLICT-AFFECTED AND HIGH-RISK AREAS 3 (2d ed. 2013), available at http://www.oecd.org/ 
daf/inv/mne/GuidanceEdition2.pdf.  DFA § 1502 requires that Exchange Act reporting companies use a 
nationally or internationally recognized due diligence framework to conduct their conflict mineral due 
diligence.  See Conflict Minerals Final Rule, 77 Fed. Reg. 56274, 56,282 (codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 240, 
249b (2012)).  One pair of commentators has suggested that the adoption of the OECD guidelines as the 
only DFA §1502-compliant due diligence framework may effectively crowd out smaller-scale local, 
regional, or national due diligence systems, including industry-based initiatives.  See Jamie Darin 
Prenkert & Scott J. Shackelford, Business, Human Rights, and the Promise of Polycentricity, 47 VAND. 
J. TRANSNAT’L L. 451, 487, 499–500 (2014). 
 240  See Desierto, supra note 235, at 365–66 (contrasting the Kimberley Process’s sole focus on the 
diamond trade to the various goods produced by child soldiers). 
 241  See id. at 366–67 (noting the unique political circumstances precipitating the Kimberley 
Process). 
 242  In the context of business and human rights, several private sector initiatives have emerged with 
the goal of disseminating best practices.  The Human Rights and Business Dilemmas Forum, a project 
implemented in partnership with the UN Global Compact, seeks to facilitate intersectoral discussion of 
human rights dilemmas through case studies.  See UN Global Compact, HUMAN RIGHTS AND BUSINESS 
DILEMMAS FORUM, http://human-rights.unglobalcompact.org (last visited Feb. 21, 2014).  A private 
sector initiative, the Global Corporate Community of Practice (GCCP), seeks to help companies collect, 
develop, and share experiences of human rights due diligence and risk management.  Launched by the 
UN Working Group on Business and Human Rights, the GCCP is aimed at assisting firms implementing 
the mandate of the Guiding Principles.  See INT’L ORG. OF EMP’RS, GLOBAL CORPORATE COMMUNITY 
OF PRACTICE FOR BUSINESS AND HUMAN RIGHTS, NEW INITIATIVE OF THE UN WORKING GROUP ON 
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practices into mandatory disclosure requirements, TST regimes would help 
MNEs mitigate the operational risks they face worldwide while also 
deepening MNEs’ commitment to the social values associated with specific 
TST regimes. 
Further, to reduce firm-level compliance costs and facilitate industry-
level best practices and regulatory experimentation, TST regimes should 
grant mutual recognition to alternate voluntary schemes that fulfill similar 
substantive purposes.243  Several European countries have either permitted 
or encouraged the use of GRI guidelines to fulfill social and environmental 
reporting requirements.244  The European Commission is currently 
considering measures that would require substantially enhanced mandatory 
disclosure by large European companies on various social matters, 
including environmental sustainability and human rights.245  This proposal 
would permit EU reporting companies to use internationally recognized 
multistakeholder frameworks in lieu of EU-based or government-
promulgated guidelines.246  Most notably, if the EU conflict minerals 
regulations proposed by the European Commission in March 2014 are 
implemented, discussions regarding potential means to grant mutual 
recognition under DFA § 1502 should be explored. 
 
2.  Empowering In-House Corporate Lawyers 
 
The effectiveness of TST depends on the usefulness of the disclosed 
information that it mandates.  Within a corporation, this responsibility 
largely lies with management in charge of day-to-day operations.  Not only 
must corporate managers ensure that the firm complies with mandatory 
disclosure requirements, they are also entrusted with exercising judgment 
 
BUSINESS AND HUMAN RIGHTS FOR A GLOBAL CORPORATE COMMUNITY OF PRACTICE (2012), 
available at http://www.ioe-emp.org/fileadmin/ioe_documents/publications/Policy%20Areas/ business_ 
and_human_rights/EN/_2012-10-15__G119_UNWG_BHR_Global_Corporate_Community_of_ 
Practice_ with_annex__website_.pdf (last visited Feb. 21, 2014). 
 243  See Hess, supra note 21, at 472 (proposing that mandatory social reporting should be consistent 
with voluntary CSR reporting schemes such as the GRI).  Mutual recognition could be also applied to 
TST regimes established by foreign regulators.  See Sarfaty, supra note 7, at 125 (proposing 
international regulatory convergence around social transparency). 
 244  See Sarfaty, supra note 21, at 599. 
 245  See Commission Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council 
Amending Council Directives 78/660/EEC and 83/349/EEC As Regards Disclosure of Non-Financial 
and Diversity Information by Certain Large Companies and Groups, COM (2013) 207 (Apr. 16, 2013). 
 246  Among the guidelines expressly granted mutual recognition are national frameworks, EU-based 
frameworks such as the Eco-Management and Audit Scheme (EMAS), and international frameworks 
such as the GRI, the Guiding Principles, the UN Global Compact, the OECD Guidelines for 
Multinational Enterprises, the International Organisation for Standardisation (ISO) 26000, and the 
International Labour Organization Tripartite Declaration of Principles Concerning Multinational 
Enterprises and Social Policy.  See id. at 9–10, 12. 
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about whether to disclose, what to disclose, and how to use disclosed 
information for the corporation’s benefit.247  In comparison to voluntary 
CSR reporting, the mandatory nature of TST regimes reduces managerial 
discretion.248  Nonetheless, managers have significant control thereby 
reinforcing concerns about their lack of accountability to shareholders and 
other stakeholders.249  For example, corporate management may decide to 
disclose more than the bare minimum required by TST rules or to use TST-
mandated disclosure to change its practices to further social goals, even if 
doing so means sacrificing short-term shareholder interests.250  
Alternatively, while there are situations in which benefits to stakeholders 
also enhance corporate profits and shareholder wealth, corporate 
management could alternatively disregard any social value for their own 
selfish ends.251  On the other hand, greater managerial discretion may free 
managers to make case-by-case determinations for the benefit of society.252 
In this context, lawyers⎯along with accountants, auditors and 
securities analysts⎯are entrusted with a core function of corporate 
governance: maximizing the effectiveness of regulatory compliance by 
reducing information asymmetries between corporations and outside 
parties.253  As informational intermediaries, they are entrusted with ensuring 
the completeness, timeliness, and readability of mandatory disclosures.254  
To carry out these duties, they collect, organize, process, and disseminate 
relevant information disclosed by firms for the benefit of investors and 
 
 247  See Lyman P.Q. Johnson & David Millon, Recalling Why Corporate Officers Are Fiduciaries, 46 
WM. & MARY L. REV. 1597, 1628–31 (2005) (describing, inter alia, the duty of loyalty, duty of 
ordinary care, and the duty to provide information and assist directors in understanding the significance 
of reported information). 
 248  See H. Rodgin Cohen & Glen T. Schleyer, Shareholder vs. Director Control Over Social Policy 
Matters: Conflicting Trends in Corporate Governance, 26 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 81, 
107 (2012) (identifying DFA § 1502 as a prominent example of the use of mandatory disclosure to 
protect shareholder interests); see also Goshen & Parchomovsky, supra note 25, at 760 (noting the 
effects of disclosure on inefficient management). 
 249  See Ribstein, supra note 14, at 1465; Shelley, supra note 102, at 116–18. 
 250  See Ostas, supra note 162, at 590. 
 251  See Ribstein, supra note 14, at 1460–61. 
 252  See David P. Baron, Private Politics, Corporate Social Responsibility, and Integrated Strategy, 
10 M.I.T. J. ECON. & MGMT. STRATEGY 7, 15 (2001) (noting the ability of altruistic managers to 
redistribute shareholders’ wealth through policies and operating practices); Shelley, supra note 102, at 
135 (acknowledging that certain kinds of managerial entrenchment may facilitate socially-beneficial 
corporate innovation).  But see Milton Friedman, The Social Responsibility of Business Is to Increase Its 
Profits, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Sept. 13, 1970, at 32 (famously arguing that corporate executives that seek to 
address social goals at the expense of shareholder interests are abrogating their social responsibilities). 
 253  See Merritt B. Fox, Gatekeeper Failures: Why Important, What to Do, 106 MICH. L. REV. 1089, 
1089, 1091 (2008) (referencing John Coffee’s thesis on the core contribution of gatekeepers). 
 254  See Preeti Choudhary, Jason D. Schloetzer & Jason D. Sturgess, Boards, Auditors, Attorneys and 
Compliance with Mandatory SEC Disclosure Rules, 34 MANAGERIAL & DEC. ECON. 471, 472 (2013) 
(defining mandatory disclosure compliance as the extent to which mandatory SEC disclosures are 
complete, timely, and readable). 
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other stakeholders.255  These gatekeepers verify the quality of securities 
disclosure on the basis of their ability to acquire more information about a 
firm than outside parties and their reputation for integrity, thoroughness, 
and accuracy.256 
Lawyers, in particular, are uniquely equipped to facilitate constructive 
discourse in TST regimes through their profession-specific skills and 
values.  Both outside counsel and in-house corporate counsel are 
responsible for preparing and reviewing the narrative and other textual parts 
of disclosure documents.257  Above all other kinds of gatekeepers, lawyers 
play an indispensable role in condensing, conceptualizing, and organizing 
information regarding an MNE’s operations.258 
In addition to their technical skills, lawyers must also exercise 
independent judgment and ethical sensibility in determining how to balance 
private corporate interests with the public interest.259  For these 
nontechnical tasks, in-house corporate lawyers are capable of helping 
embed compliance with mandatory disclosure requirements into corporate 
decision making processes, thereby consolidating their effectiveness in 
shaping corporate conduct.260  Due to their knowledge of their clients’ 
unique risk appetites, strategic priorities, and organizational cultures, in-
house counsel can communicate in the firm-specific and industry-specific 
language necessary to influence corporate management to comply with 
mandatory disclosure obligations.261 
The value of in-house counsel is particularly high with respect to TST 
regimes.  For MNEs subject to heightened scrutiny from regulators, 
shareholders, and the public, inadequate internal communication and 
coordination channels can materially impact their ability to comply with 
TST regimes that require substantial information gathering, internal 
controls, and due diligence processes.262  In-house lawyers directly 
 
 255  See FUNG, GRAHAM & WEIL, supra note 4, at 122–25; Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 46, at 
687–89; Hess, supra note 49, at 466–67. 
 256  See JOHN C. COFFEE, JR., GATEKEEPERS: THE PROFESSIONS AND CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 2 
(2006) (defining gatekeepers); see also Stephen M. Bainbridge, Corporate Lawyers as Gatekeepers, 8 
U.C.L.A. SCHOLARLY PERSP. 1, 5 (2012), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm? 
abstract_id=1980975 (comparing the gatekeeping role of lawyers to auditors). 
 257  Choudhary, Schloetzer & Sturgess, supra note 254, at 472, 477. 
 258  See Choudhary, Schloetzer & Sturgess, supra note 254, at 482–83 (finding empirical evidence 
that corporate attorneys are predominantly responsible for the readability of mandatory disclosure 
documents). 
 259  See Manne, supra note 27, at 482–83. 
 260  The concept of embeddedness measures the degree to which information produced by mandatory 
disclosure causes new responses by its users and then changes in the decision-making processes of 
disclosers.  See Fung, Weil, Graham & Fagotto, supra note 27, at 15. 
 261  See Omari Scott Simmons & James D. Dinnage, Innkeepers: A Unifying Theory of the In-House 
Counsel Role, 41 SETON HALL L. REV. 77, 117–18 (2011). 
 262  See Martin, supra note 176, at 988–90 (identifying the importance of board-level information 
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participate in the management and improvement of compliance systems.263  
In this capacity, in-house counsel can help change perceptions of the 
perceived value of TST-mandated disclosure to other corporate goals.  
Buttressed by the risk of civil and criminal enforcement for noncompliance 
with U.S. federal securities law, TST may help in-house counsel convince 
otherwise skeptical or uncertain internal clients of the importance of social 
transparency to the firm.264 
On top of ensuring a firm’s compliance with TST requirements, in-
house lawyers are well suited to contribute to internal deliberations about 
how social responsibility should be incorporated into broader business 
strategies.265  Due to their knowledge of legal lexicon, argumentation, and 
procedures, in-house lawyers are capable of translating legal rules into the 
system-specific language necessary to influence senior management.266  
Lawyers are uniquely equipped to use their persuasive and rhetorical skills 
to reframe the social goals of TST in a manner that reinforces their value 
and importance to the firm’s business.267  In other words, in-house lawyers 
can—and should—help their clients identify, understand, and implement 
the strategic dimensions of constructive discourse. 
The ability of in-house lawyers to properly discharge their gatekeeping 
functions can be compromised by cognitive bias, groupthink, and other 
behavioral impediments that diminish their cognitive independence.268  In 
addition, the effectiveness of lawyers’ gatekeeping function heavily 
depends on the authority of in-house lawyers within a firm.  This may vary 
 
gathering to ensure that directors can effectively address conflicts between business and human rights); 
see also Malloy, supra note 8, at 633 (noting the potential impact of regulation in facilitating review and 
adjustment of internal operating procedures that impede non-compliance with disclosure obligations). 
 263  See Simmons & Dinnage, supra note 261, at 121 (noting the routine monitoring and crisis 
intervention functions of in-house counsel). 
 264  See Tanina Rostain, General Counsel in the Age of Compliance: Preliminary Findings and New 
Research Questions, 21 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 465, 488–89 (2008) (noting the positive effect of the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act on the authority of general counsels vis-à-vis board directors and senior managers); 
Patrick Schmidt, The Ethical Lives of Securities Lawyers, in LAWYERS IN PRACTICE: ETHICAL DECISION 
MAKING IN CONTEXT 221, 238–39 (Leslie C. Levin & Lynn Mather eds., 2012) (documenting how 
securities lawyers use the fear of liability to advocate for greater disclosure by their clients). 
 265  Simmons & Dinnage, supra note 261, at 125–26. 
 266  See Karin Buhmann, Business and Human Rights: Analysing Discursive Articulation of 
Stakeholder Interests to Explain the Consensus-Based Construction of the 'Protect, Respect, Remedy UN 
Framework,’ 1 INT’L L. RES. 88, 94 (2012) (showing how stakeholders can influence corporate conduct 
by translating CSR mandates, such as the Guiding Principles, into system-specific language that MNEs 
can understand and implement). 
 267  See Joe W. (Chip) Pitts III, Business, Human Rights, & the Environment: The Role of the Lawyer 
in CSR & Ethical Globalization, 26 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 479, 494–95, 497 (2008) (arguing that 
lawyers can use storytelling and story appreciation, among other skills, to strengthen the business case 
for CSR). 
 268  See Donald C. Langevoort, Getting (Too) Comfortable: In-House Lawyers, Enterprise Risk, and 
the Financial Crisis, 2012 WIS. L. REV. 495, 508–15 (2012) (identifying the cognitive biases that 
blinded in-house lawyers to the risks posed by subprime mortgages). 
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widely based on seniority, their relationship with senior corporate 
management, the deference accorded to in-house lawyers on discretionary 
decisions of a legal nature, and the extent to which disclosure-related duties 
are given instead to outside counsel.269  Due to their proximity to corporate 
management, in-house lawyers may be particularly vulnerable to pressure 
from their clients qua colleagues to “get the deal done”—i.e., in respect of 
mandatory disclosure obligations, to disclose only as much as their 
business-side clients want.270  This may lead lawyers to use standardized, 
cautious, and ultimately less useful language in their disclosure—i.e., the 
oft-maligned, but often useful, boilerplate.271  The indiscriminate use of 
boilerplate by lawyers may adversely and unpredictably affect the ways in 
which users of information process and respond to disclosure.272  Risk-
averse behavior by lawyers is also enabled by the ambiguity of many 
disclosure rules under U.S. federal securities law—most notably, the 
concept of materiality.273  By not requiring materiality in order to trigger 
disclosure, DFA § 1502 and ITRA § 219 remove discretion from lawyers 
thereby eliminating one potential source of client pressure. 
To overcome the challenges described above, in-house lawyers can 
draw on the shared set of beliefs and knowledge that define them as 
members of an epistemic community.  An epistemic community is “a 
network of professionals with recognized expertise and competence in a 
particular domain and an authoritative claim to policy-relevant knowledge 
within that domain or issue area.”274  In a similar vein to the international 
treaty making and policy coordination between governments described by 
Robert Haas, corporate policy making can benefit from the engagement of 
like-minded professionals who can converse in a shared vernacular, gather 
and disseminate information, and convince leaders of their value.275  
 
 269  See Choudhary, Schloetzer & Sturgess, supra note 254, at 475; Arthur B. Laby, Differentiating 
Gatekeepers, 1 BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L. 119, 128–32 (2006) (characterizing lawyers as 
“dependent” gatekeepers whose responsibility to third parties is often in tension with their responsibility 
to clients). 
 270  See Robert L. Nelson & Laura Beth Nielsen, Cops, Counsel, and Entrepreneurs: Constructing 
the Role of Inside Counsel in Large Corporations, 34 L. & SOC. REV. 457, 471 (2000). 
 271  See Schmidt, supra note 264, at 240–42 (documenting the use of boilerplate by securities lawyers 
in disclosure documents); see also Davis, supra note 173, at 158 (describing the “cynical adoption of 
token gestures decoupled from actual practice” as an impediment to the effectiveness of regulatory 
requirements on corporate governance). 
 272  See Schmidt, supra note 264, at 241–42 (asking how securities lawyers can produce legally 
compliant language in disclosure documents while refraining from pressuring clients to produce 
meaningful information to the public). 
 273  See Laby, supra note 269, at 149–50. 
 274  Peter M. Haas, Introduction: Epistemic Communities and International Policy Coordination, 46 
INT’L ORG. 1, 3 (1992).  Haas further defined an epistemic community as based on a shared set of 
normative and principled beliefs, shared causal beliefs, shared notions of validity, and a common policy 
enterprise.  Id. 
 275  See id. at 15–16 (noting the ability of epistemic communities to define the self-interests of a state 
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Epistemic communities of in-house lawyers defined by industry, issue area, 
or regulatory focus can serve as a means for enhancing substantively 
meaningful TST disclosure by firms.276 
In the case of in-house counsel, their membership is driven by a 
combination of (i) a lawyer’s professional training, (ii) externally imposed 
disclosure requirements to which the firm is subject, and (iii) the internally 
modulated judgment exercised by the lawyer to satisfy these externally 
imposed requirements in respect of a given set of facts.277  A key 
characteristic of this epistemic community of in-house counsel is that its 
group function and the individual obligations of its members are defined by 
their dual identity as employees of a corporation and as professionals.278  
The functional and normative coherence of epistemic communities’ group 
norms may be enforced through peer pressure and reputational awards 
among themselves.279  Their shared professional ties may be strong enough 
to compel compliance through “soft” community-imposed sanctions.280  
Coinciding with the emergence of TST regimes, numerous initiatives to 
inculcate in-house counsel on global social values have emerged in recent 
years.281 
 
or factions within it); see also Peter M. Haas, Banning Chlorofluorocarbons: Epistemic Community 
Efforts to Protect Stratospheric Ozone, 46 INT’L ORG. 187 (1992) (describing the impact of an 
ecological epistemic community in influencing policymakers to respond to ozone depletion); Harold 
Hongju Koh, Why Do Nations Obey International Law?, 106 YALE L.J. 2599, 2656 (1997) (suggesting 
that epistemic communities consisting of international organizations, NGOs, and private foundations 
help compel state compliance with international human rights). 
 276  See Shaun Barnes, Kathleen G. Cully & Steven L. Schwarcz, In-House Counsel’s Role in the 
Structuring of Mortgage-Backed Securities, 2012 WIS. L. REV. 521, 543 (2012) (noting that industry 
associations can serve as valuable sources of expertise that in-house counsel can draw on in crafting 
compliance systems).  This approach does not obviate the potential value of externally enforced 
certification schemes and similar measures to improve the quality of mandatory disclosure.  See, e.g., 
COFFEE, supra note 256, at 347–52 (proposing that issuers be required to appoint outside counsel to 
monitor and certify the issuer's disclosure documents, which would be subject to SEC discipline for 
failure to do so); Fox, supra note 253, at 1108–10 (proposing that investment banks instead of law firms 
serve this role); Laby, supra note 269, at 160–61 (proposing that securities lawyers be required to certify 
to the SEC that they are not aware of a material violation or have reported any such violation “up the 
ladder” as required by the Sarbanes-Oxley Act). 
 277  See Schmidt, supra note 264, at 227–28 (referring to a “community of practice” of securities 
lawyers and describing the difficulty in accurately identifying its members). 
 278  See Nelson & Nielsen, supra note 270, at 478; Schmidt, supra note 264, at 237–38. 
 279  See Charles K. Whitehead, What’s Your Sign?—International Norms, Signals, and Compliance, 
27 MICH. J. INT’L L. 695, 707–12 (2006); see also Ostas, supra note 162, at 593 (observing that a 
corporate manager’s social responsibility is shaped by the social impact of his or her actions rather than 
by a duty to obey the law). 
 280  The ABA’s professional responsibility code clarifies the fiduciary-like duties of lawyers to 
stakeholders, including providing that “[a] lawyer . . . is . . . an officer of the legal system and a public 
citizen having a special responsibility for the quality of justice.”  See Pitts III, supra note 267, at 491 
(citing and quoting the preamble to the American Bar Association Model Rules of Professional 
Conduct). 
 281  For example, the International Bar Association and the UN Global Compact have collaborated on 
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3.  Incentivizing Social Transparency Through Competition 
 
Social transparency can be a competitive process—rather than merely 
a “box-checking” compliance function—if the market recognizes and 
rewards MNEs for producing a positive social impact.282  One way to 
leverage the positive effects of market competition is to implement ratings 
and other metrics of social performance.283  TST has the potential to go a 
step further by incentivizing MNEs to disclose by using the carrot of 
competition instead of the stick of compliance.284  This “carrot” approach 
does not exempt MNEs from mandatory disclosure but rather conditions the 
imposition of TST requirements on the MNE’s decision to enter a new 
market or business.285 
A carrot-based approach to TST is evident in connection with the 
lifting of U.S. trade and investment sanctions against Burma in July 
2012.286  Since 1997, the U.S. government has imposed a wide range of 
sanctions against Burma for political oppression and widespread human 
rights abuses committed by the Burmese military government.287  Under the 
Burma Responsible Investment Reporting Requirements, a U.S. company 
may invest in Burma subject to the submission of an annual report on their 
activities in the country.288  The disclosure requirements address a wide 
 
a module-based video training manual targeted to in-house counsel interested in human rights, labor, the 
environment, and anticorruption.  See Int’l Bar Ass’n & UN Global Compact, Lawyers as Leaders – 
Business and Human Rights Module, Lawyers as Leaders: The Essential Role of Legal Counsel in the 
Corporate Sustainability Agenda, INT’L BAR ASS’N, http://www.ibanet.org/Article/Detail.aspx? 
ArticleUid=60827E49-44DF-43DE-94B2-11157DB1FDB9. 
 282  See Fung, Weil, Graham & Fagotto, supra note 27, at 15 (noting the potential impact of 
disclosure when firms perceive benefits to disclosure vis-à-vis their competitors). 
 283  See Keenan, supra note 224, at 557–59 (proposing the creation and use of human rights ratings 
by international financial institutions).  But see Sarfaty, supra note 21, at 616 (warning that quantitative 
data is insufficient to capture the full meaning of human rights). 
 284  See Doreen McBarnet, Corporate Social Responsibility Beyond Law, Through Law, For Law 37 
(Edinburgh School of Law Working Paper Series, 2009/03, 2009) (citing the Hampton Review in the 
United Kingdom, which proposed less regulatory inspection for companies that demonstrate themselves 
to be responsible); see also PHILIP HAMPTON, HM TREASURY, REDUCING ADMINISTRATIVE BURDENS: 
EFFECTIVE INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT, REPORT, 2005, ¶ 2.24 (2005), available at 
http://www.berr.gov.uk/ files/file22988.pdf (noting the use of “earned autonomy” by U.K. regulators). 
 285  Cf. Gerrit De Geest & Giuseppe Dari-Mattiacci, The Rise of Carrots and the Decline of Sticks, 80 
U. CHI. L. REV. 341, 383 (2013) (justifying carrots for sellers to reveal information only when it is 
unclear which party is the least-cost information gatherer). 
 286  See  Press Release, The White House, Statement by the President on the Easing of Sanctions on 
Burma (July 11, 2012), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2012/07/11/statement-
president-easing-sanctions-burma (announcing the “easing [of] restrictions to allow U.S. companies to 
responsibly do business in Burma”). 
 287  See U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, OFFICE OF FOREIGN ASSETS CONTROL, BURMA SANCTIONS 
PROGRAM (2014), available at http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/sanctions/Documents/ 
burma.pdf. 
 288  See Burmese Sanctions Regulations, 79 Fed. Reg. 37,106, 37,119 (amending 31 C.F.R. § 
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range of social impacts associated with U.S. business investment in Burma, 
including human rights, labor rights, land rights, community consultations 
and stakeholder engagement, environmental stewardship, anticorruption, 
arrangements with security service providers, risk and impact assessment 
and mitigation, payments to the Burmese government, any investments with 
the Myanmar Oil and Gas Enterprise (MOGE), and contact with the 
Burmese military or nonstate armed groups.289  In contrast to the TST 
regimes under U.S. federal securities law examined in this Article, the 
Burma Responsible Investment Reporting Requirements use mandatory 
disclosure as a means to promote discretionary business activity, rather than 
as a condition to continued business activity.  Future initiatives to 
implement TST under U.S. federal securities law may be amenable to this 
carrot-like approach. 
 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
 
The observations in this Article present a number of interesting 
empirical and normative questions concerning the use of constructive 
discourse and TST.  In particular, one area for future scholarly exploration 
concerns the effectiveness of TST along several differentiating factors: (i) 
noncorporate business organizations, most notably various types of 
partnerships; (ii) different policy objectives, such as environmental 
sustainability and labor rights; (iii) the interaction of multiple policy 
objectives within the same TST regime, exemplified by the various 
statutory mandates of ITRA § 219; and (iv) the impact of TST regimes on 
MNEs’ existing relationships with different stakeholder groups. 
The use of mandatory disclosure as a means of facilitating social 
transparency reveals the challenges of global governance.  TST regimes 
such as DFA § 1502 and ITRA § 219 have emerged in the context of an 
increasingly diverse, and sometimes conflicting, array of mandatory and 
voluntary corporate social reporting systems.  The integrative and 
expressive dimensions of mandatory disclosure, evident in the concept of 
constructive discourse, suggest specific ways that MNEs can use the 
process and output of TST for their own benefit. 
 
537.530); U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, OMB NO. 1405-0209, RESPONSIBLE INVESTMENT REPORTING 
REQUIREMENTS (2013), available at http://www.humanrights.gov/wp-content/uploads/2013/05/ 
Responsible-Investment-Reporting-Requirements-Final.pdf.  This annual reporting requirement applies 
to any new investment in Burma over $500,000. 
 289  See U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, FACT SHEET: BURMA RESPONSIBLE INVESTMENT REPORTING 
REQUIREMENTS (2013), available at http://www.humanrights.gov/2013/06/19/fact-sheet-burma-
responsible-investment-reporting-requirements. 
